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UNCHARTERED TERRITORY: MARKET COMPETITION'S
CONSTITUTIONAL COLLISION WITH
ENTREPRENEURIAL SEX-SEGREGATED
CHARTER SCHOOLS
David Groshoff*

I. INTRODUCTION 1

* David Groshoff is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Providence College's School of
Business and begins his appointment as an Assistant Professor of Law at Western
State
University's
College
of
Law
in
August
2010.
I profoundly thank Dr. Katherine K. Merseth of the Harvard Graduate School of
Education and Dr. Effendi Leonard of M.I.T. for their unyielding assistance and
support. Also, I am grateful to Dr. Vicki Jacobs, Joshua Beauregard, Andres Castro
Samayoa, Susan Kandel, and Dr. Meira Levinson of Harvard University, as well as to
Professor David S. Cohen of Drexel University's Earle Mack School of Law and Dr.
Cornelius Riordan of Providence College. I owe a debt of gratitude to Bruce Johanssen,
Richard Ream, Robert Kuykendall, Bret Michael Sychak, Ralph Saenz, Darren Leader,
Russ Parrish, and Travis Haley. All erroneous statements and assertions are solely my
own.
1. The following definitions explain the terms used in this article. First, "statusconscious," "status-identifiable," "single-sex," and "sex-segregated," include some of the
terms that legal scholars have used to identify schooling that separates students based
on sex. See, C.f?., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pra{?matic Understanding of StatusConsciousness: The Case of Dere{?ulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753 (2000); David S.
Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist Myth of
Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135 (2009); Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational
Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
451 (1999). Unless quoting third parties, I use the term "sex-segregated" to describe
this type of education.
Second, despite Justice Ginsburg's desire to use "the term 'gender discrimination' as a
synonym for 'sex discrimination,'" Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of
Foreign Law on Her Court, and Vice Versa, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14, the
terms "gender'' and "sex" are distinguishable in practice, and the legal community
should be hesitant to equate these terms. See, e.g., Patience W. Crozier, Forcing Boys to
Be Boys: The Persecution of Gender Non-Conforming Youth, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
123, 125-26 (2001) ("Sex refers to whether a person is male or female based largely on
anatomical factors such as external genitalia. Gender refers to the characteristics
associated with masculinity and femininity." (quoting CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE
WAR AGAINST BOYS (Simon & Schuster 2000)) (citations omitted)); see also Anna I.
Corwin, Language and Gender Variance: Constructing Gender Beyond the
Male I Female Binary, 12 ELECT. J. HUM. SEXUALITY (2009), available at
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"The concept of a charter school is based on the free-market
theories of the [1976 Nobel Prize winning] libertarian
economist Milton Friedman, who asserted that providing
parents with a choice would result in an overall improvement
in the school system." 2 After winning an election campaign in
http://www.ejhs.orgNolume12/Gender.htm (indicating that the meaning of gender is
broader than that of sex). I therefore consider solely the legal question of charter
schools segregating students born with - and continuing to possess - male or female
genitalia, and I assume that the broader gender-relevant legal implications involved
with intersex, transsexual, transgender, and genderqueer individuals are beyond the
scope of this Article. Thus, to reflect the specific analysis appropriately, I use the term
"sex," rather than Justice Ginsburg's preferred but more confused use of "gender."
Third, for the definition of "charter school," see infra Part II.B.l. Depending on context,
I use "charter" and "charter school" interchangeably.
Fourth, "public" in the context of public education is amorphous ("In a world where
charter schooling . . . and other recent developments no longer fit neatly into our
conventional mental boxes .... [t]he 'publicness' of a school does not depend on class
size, the use of certified teachers, rules governing employee termination. or the rest of
the procedural apparatus that ensnares traditional district schools." Frederick M.
Hess, What is a ''Public School?" Principles for a New Century, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 1,
1, 14 (2004)). Massachusetts Secretary of Education Paul Reville recently asserted that
public schools have traditionally been "large-scale, highly bureaucratic, monopolistic"
institutions; I use the term "traditional public" to refer to these schools. KATHERINE K.
MERSETH, INSIDE URBAN CHARTER SCHOOLS: PROMISING PRACTICES A~D STRATEGIES IN
FIVE HIGH-PERFORMING SCHOOLS x (Harvard Education Press 2009). Because charters
are materially government financed, see infra Part II.B.1, charters are "public schools."
I therefore discuss two flavors of K-12 public schools in this Article: traditional public
and charters. While other schools, including religious, parochial, and independent
schools, may receive limited federal funding, see infra Part III, or state funding via
vouchers, see infra Part IV.E, I define a "private" school as one that receives a
substantial majority of its funding from non-government sources.
Fifth, "sex-segregated charters" signifies charters whose activities are entirely sexsegregated. As of July 2009, nearly twenty percent of publicly funded sex-segregated
education in the U.S. is sex-segregated according to this definition. Nat'! Assoc. for
Single Sex Pub. Educ., http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-schools.htm (last visited
July 7, 2009) ("NASSPE") (indicating that "at least 91 of the 540 public schools
[offering some type of sex-segregated education] . . . qualify as single-sex schools,
meaning that students attending any of those schools have all their school activities including lunch and all electives- in a setting which is all-boys or all-girls.").
2. CHARTER SCH. INST., STATE UN!V. OF N.Y., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT
CHARTER
SCHOOLS,
2.2
(2008)
http://www.newyorkcharters.org/documents/generalFAQ12-4-07cov.doc (last visited
March 26, 2010). The Charter Schools Institute (SUNY) functions as one of three types
of entities created by New York to authorize and oversee charters. The other two are
the New York State Board of Regents and certain local boards of education, including
New York City and Buffalo. Milton Friedman supported a neoclassical economic
philosophy that opposed the then-dominant Keynesian economic model (which asserted
that government, rather than free and rationally acting market participants, should
direct the allocation of resources and capital); see, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 12829 (Simon & Schuster 2002) (1998). Relating Friedman's philosophy to school choice,
"[t]he most authoritative proponents of 'educational choice' have relied on the language
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which his opponents labeled his policies socialistic, 3 while at
the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce ("USHCC") President
Barack Obama embraced the market-based school choice
attributed to Friedman and "call[ed] on states to reform their
charter rules and lift caps on the number of allowable charter
schools, wherever such caps are in place." 4 Four broad reasons
support why the President chose to highlight charter market
expansion at the USHCC. First, Latinos constitute a significant
and growing population in urban education. 5 Second,
traditional urban public schools historically have been inferior
to non-urban public schools. 6 Third, many policymakers have
advocated charters as potential solutions to the specific
problems facing urban public education. 7 Fourth, chambers of

of economics to account and argue for this shift in policy direction, suggesting that
competitive markets ensure that service providers will be more innovative, responsive,
and efficient than government 'monopolies."' .Jeffrey R. Henig et a!., Does Mission
Matter, in A GUlllE TO CHARTER SCHOOLS, RESEARCH AND ADVICE FOR EDUCATORS 130
(Myron S. Kayes & Robert Maranto eds., Rowman & Littlefield Education 1992)
(citations omitted). Nobel Pri;-;e winning economist Gary Becker indicated that
Friedman's intellectual contributions allowed one to "apply economic analysis to an
array of social issues," and "take markets, rationality and incentives and illuminate
issues involving race, education, and the family." YERCIN & STANISLAW at 129.
3. See ABC News Political Radar Blog, Palin Invokes Socialism Charge Against
Obama, Oct. 20, 2008, http:l/blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2008/10/palin-invokess.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (stating, "Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin continued the
Republican ticket's attempt to tie Sen. Barack Obama to what it calls socialist
economic policie,; ... .");see also Klaus Marre, Obama Ridicules Socialism Charge, THE
HILL, Oct. 29, 2008, http://thehill.com/campaign-2008/obama-ridicules-socialismcharge-2008-10-29.html (last visited Jul. 5, 2009).
4. See Transcript of Comments, Obama's Remarks on Education, Mar. 10, 2009,
http://blogs. wsj.com/wash wire/2009/03/1 0/obamas-remarks-on -education-2/ (last visited
Mar. 26, 2010).
5. See, e.g., Edgar G. Epps, Race and School Desegregation: Contemporary Legal
and Educational Issues 1 U. PENN. GSE URBAN ED. J. Article 3 (2002) (asserting that
"Latino students will soon become the largest non-European racial/ethnic group in the
public schools, and like African Americans, they tend to be urban dwellers and
disproportionately from lower income families.") (references omitted); see also Min
Zhou, Urban Education: Challenges in Educating Culturally Diverse Children, 105
TEACHERS COL. RECORDS 208 (2003).
6. See, e.g, JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: HOW SCHOOLS STRUCTURE
INEQUALITY 1-39, 261-285 (Yale University Press 2d ed. 2005) (1985);, JONATHAN
KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN
AMERICA 1-62 (Crown Publishers 2005).
7. See, e.g., Katherine Santiago, U.S. Education Secretary to Visit Newark
Charter School North Star Academy, THE STAR-LEDGER, Jun. 5, 2009 (stating that "[i]n
New Jersey, as in many states, they [charters] have focused on the most troubled
urban neighborhoods, and some have shown great successes."), available at
http://www .nj .com/news/index.ssf/2009/06/us_education_secretary_to_ visi.html; see also
an example of a charter law favoring urban areas, infra note 21.
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commerce tend to support market-based solutions. While some
people may interpret President Obama's statement to mean
that charter rules have not been reformed recently, the U.S.
Department of Education ("DOE") materially modified its rules
and regulations affecting charters in 2006, 8 and some states
also encouraged meaningful charter innovation in the past
several years. 9 Within his first hundred days after taking
office, President Obama executed federal incentives persuading
states to develop their charter markets further, 10 and the
Senate confirmed Arne Duncan, a supporter of public school
innovation that included sex-segregated public schooling, as
Secretary of Education. 11 These recent events have made rules
and regulations more accommodating for charter market
expansion and innovation, including for charters that
exclusively admit a single sex of students. 12
Despite a political environment that appears to support the
creation of sex-segregated charters, the judicial backdrop
affecting them is far more opaque. Only once has the U.S.

8. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62531, 62535, 62540-41 (Oct. 25,
2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) [hereinafter 2006' DOE Regulations].
9. For example, in 2008, Delaware amended its charter laws to permit sexsegregated education. See infra note 45.
10. See, e.g., Gintautas Dumicus, Menino Makes Pitch for More Charter Schools,
DORCHESTEH
REPORTEH,
July
22,
2009,
available
at
http://www.dotnews.com/2009/menino-makes-pitch-more-charter-schools (stating that
Boston Teachers Union President Richard Stutman accused Boston Mayor Thomas
Menino of changing his position to favor charters in part due to "the federal
government's dangling of $5 billion in incentives for loosening charter school
regulations.");see also H.R. Con. Res. 1, lll'h Cong. (2009) (enacted) [hereinafter
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act].
11. Obama Taps Arne Duncan for Secretary of ED [sic], ~<:SCHOOLNEWS, Dec. Hi,
2008, http://www .eschoolnews.com/2008/12/16/obama-taps-arne-duncan-for-secretaryof-ed/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2010) (stating that as CEO of Chicago's Public Schools,
Duncan ... discussed the launch of several non-traditional ... schools. including .
. . single-sex ... schools. Bringing specialized schools to Chicago, Duncan said,
would cater to students' varied abilities and interests . .
[W]e know that not
every child learns the same way ... [s]ome children learn better in a classroom
surrounded by all boys or all girls.).
See also, Editorial, Arne Duncan: A Reformer as U.S. Education Secretary. SEATTLE
TIMES,
Dec.
17,
2008,
available
at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/2008532391_edit18educa.html
(describing Duncan as an urban public school superintendent who historically
supported charters).
12. Over the past fifteen years, educational entrepreneurs created approximately
3,000 new charters. See U.S. Charter Schools, About the Charter School Movement,
http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs_docs/o/movement.htm (last visited Aug. 3,
2009); see also Delaware's 2008 changes, infra note 45.
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Supreme Court decided a case that classified primary and
secondary ("K-12") public school students based on sex, and
that ruling was made by an equally divided Court, without any
published opinion. 13 The district court in that case indicated
that analyzing sex-based classifications in K-12 public schools
was a new and "unchartered territory." 14 Since that time,
however, not only has the Court failed to rule on sex-based
classifications in K-12 public schools in general, but it also has
provided convoluted guidance on K-12 market-based choice
schools and K-12 school segregation 15 that otherwise could
have been helpful in creating and assessmg the
constitutionality of sex-segregated charters.
Due to the recent growth in sex-segregated charters, the
welcoming political landscape that currently encourages their
creation, and the lack of direction by the Supreme Court, this
Article explores what happens when market competition and
choice - generally regarded as innocuous principles supported
by many individuals across the U.S. political spectrum 16 - are
(a) applied to education, (b) combined with empirical evidence
of charter success in educating urban students, and (c) mixed
with policy arguments that form the basis of sex-segregated
charters. 17 By attempting to navigate the scant potentially
relevant guidance from the Court, the Article analyzes how
sex-segregated charters, including those expressly authorized

13. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
14. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 400 F. Supp. 326, 335 (E.D. Pa.
1975), reu'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 430 U.S.
703 (1977).
15. Despite turnover among the Court's members, including its Chief Justice, the
Court's two most recent cases involving the constitutionality of K·12 school choice
programs and segregation were both 5-4 decisions in which the justices issued an
unusually high six opinions per case. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); see
discussion infra Part IV.E-F.
16. See, e.g., GARY MIRON & CHRISTOPHER NELSON, WHAT'S PUBLIC ABOUT
CHARTER SCHOOLS? LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT CHOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (Corwin
Press 2002) (stating that charters are supported by both liberals and conservatives,
and asserting that because ''the charter concept is so politically ambidextrous [it] has
contributed, no doubt, to the movement's impressive growth over the past decade."); see
also Sharpton, Gingrich, Duncan Team Up on School Reform, USA TODAY, Aug. 14,
2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2009-08-14-sharpton-gingrich_N.htm?csp=34
(last visited Aug. 15, 2009) (indicating that former Republican Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Newt Gingrich "applauded Obama for showing 'real courage on the
issue of charter schools."').
17. See infra Part V.A.
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by state legislatures, may comport with Title IX of the Patsy
Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act 1x and the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 19 The Article
concludes that despite the ostensibly benevolent goals of the
educational entrepreneurs that create charters, many sexsegregated charters violate the law.
Part II provides a general history of the educational
inequality and market-based theories that helped lead to the
public school reform movement and the creation of charters,
particularly in urban areas. This Part articulates what
constitutes a charter and provides examples of various flavors
of innovative charters and charter-enabling legislation,
including laws sanctioning sex-segregated charters. I argue
that successful charters prosper not only due to market
mechanisms but also because of stakeholder20 buy-in and the
implementation of recognized organizational structure theory.
This Part also asserts that because charters often have been
created to benefit urban students21 who have historically been
subjected to inferior public education in the U.S., 22 expanded

18. 20 U.S. C. § 1681 (2009) [hereinafter Title IX].
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
20. No generally accepted definition exists for public education stakeholders.
Stacey M. Childress and Allen S. Grossman of Harvard Business School stated that
stakeholders were "people and groups inside and outside the organization who have a
legitimate interest in the system and can influence the effectiveness of the strategy.
These include teachers, principals and their unions, parents, school boards, community
and advocacy groups, and local politicians and policymakers, among others." Mallory
Stark, Public Education Goes to School, HARV. Bus. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE. (Dec.
19, 2005). The Texas Public Education Information Resource indicated that
stakeholders in public education included "administrators, educators, state leadership,
researchers, and professional organizations . . . . " Texas P-16 Public Education
Information Resource, http://www.texaseducationinfo.org/tpeir/ (last visited Aug. 3,
2009). The title of Edie L. Holcomb's book argues for another meaning-ful stakeholder
in public education: STUDENTS ARE STAKEHOLDERS, TOO!: lNCLUOING EVERY VOICF: IN
AUTHENTIC HIGH SCHOOL REFORM (Corwin Press 2007).
21. See, e.g., Missouri's requirement that "[c]harter schools may be operated only
in a metropolitan school district or in an urban school district containing most or all of
a city with a population greater than three hundred fifty thousand inhabitants .... ".
MO. REV. STAT.§ 160.400.2 (2008).
22. See generally Beth C. Rubin, eta!., Structuring Inequality at Berheley High, in
UNFINISHED BL"SINESS: CLOSING THF: RACIAL ACHIEVF:MENT GAP IN OUR SCHOOLS 29-86
(Pedro Noguera & Jean Yonemura Wing, eds., .Jossey-Bass Puhlishler 2006); KOZOL,
supra note 6; PEDRO NOGUF:RA, CITY SCHOOLS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 82-102
(Teachers College Press 2003); Dorothy Shipps, The Bu.,inessman's Edncator: Mayoral
Takeover and Nontraditional Leadership in Chicago, in PoWERFUL REFORMS WITH
SHALLOW ROOTS: IMPROVING AMERICA'S URilAN SCHOOLS 16-37 (Larry Cuban &
Michael Usdan, eds., Teachers College Press 200.'3) (asserting that urban and minority
students overwhelmingly have received inferior public educations to students at non-
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charter innovation may help shrink the achievement gap that
exists in urban public education. 23 As a result, charter caps
arguably deny access to a better education for hundreds of
thousands of mostly urban students 24 - the students with the
least relative social capital25 to spend in an educational
marketplace. I maintain that while de jure charter caps may
not be the pressing hobgoblin that some people assert,
legislators and entrepreneurs should continue expanding the
number of charters into a larger and less illiquid market,
creating a more efficient public school landscape.
Part III considers Title IX as it applies to schools that
admit and administer education solely to students of a specific
sex to the exclusion of the other sex. A combination of the latest
re-authorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act 26 (currently known as the "No Child Left Behind Act" 27
("NCLB")) and the 2006 DOE Regulations encouraged the
development of sex-segregated charters and raised questions
about these schools' constitutionality. Based on legislative and
judicial history, this Part addresses the viability of sexsegregated charters under Title IX.
Part IV discusses the judicial underpinnings that
potentially relate to sex-segregated charters. Here, I review the
development of the intermediate level of scrutiny that courts
apply to sex-based government classifications as well as the
heightened tests that courts use in the context of public
education. I argue that while charters are schools of choice, the
Court's recent private choice doctrine is irrelevant to charters;
the Court's guidance in K-12 racial segregation, however, may
help to frame part of an understandable analytic for the

urban public schools).
23. While I use the term "achievement gap," Gloria Ladson-Billings instead refers
to an "education debt" that "comprises historical, economic, sociopolitical, and moral
components" that are analogous "with the concept of national debt." Gloria LadsonBillings, From the Achievement Gap to the Education Debt: Understanding Achievement
in U.S. Schools, 35 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3 (2006).
24. See, Editorial, Blachboard Pulpit, Encouraging the Spread of Charter Schools,
WASH. POST, Jun. 22,2009 at A14 (stating that "[a]n estimated 365,000 students are on
waiting lists to get into charter schools.").
25. See James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,
Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to
the Analysis of Social Structure, 94 AM. J. Soc. 895 (1988).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 3.381 (1965) [hereinafter ESEA]. The ESEA was originally
authori;;;ed until 1970 but has been reauthorized to the present in various forms.
27. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2001).
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constitutionality of sex-segregated charters.
Because so many variations of charters and charter laws
exist, examining more than one of them is beyond the scope of
this Article. Part V investigates one example of the
constitutionality of sex-segregated charters in an application
approved by New York in June 2009. New York provides a
compelling study because its legislature authorized the
creation of sex-segregated charters, sex-segregated charters
currently operate there, and the state is transparent in its
objectives and interests for approving and funding sexsegregated charters. This Part applies the Court's potentially
applicable tests to this charter application approval and
evaluates whether any of the Court's safe harbors for sex-based
government classifications may be relevant to the charter
application.
The Article closes by recognizing that market mechanisms,
organizational architectures, and stakeholder buy-in are the
three essential features of charter success. It acknowledges
that charters can be valuable tools in the struggle to improve
urban public education. But while strong policy arguments and
substantiated results favor continued charter evolution,
insufficient evidence exists for many sex-segregated charters,
as currently constituted, to pass legal scrutiny. I conclude that
the three essential characteristics of charters - not sexsegregation - are what make a measurable difference in
improved student achievement. As a result, no exceedingly
persuasive justification exists for states to maintain most sexsegregated charters. To have any meaningful chance of
surviving Title IX and Equal Protection Clause challenges, sexsegregated charter legislation, applications, and charter
documents must employ specific language that the Court has
indicated may survive constitutional scrutiny. Using such
precise diction in hopes of passing judicial review, however,
would likely force the proponents of sex-segregated charters to
change the vision and practice of the schools that they wish to
create. But without the de facto implementation of such
wording, sex-segregated charters likely violate Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause.

2]
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EVERYTHING YOU WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT CHARTERS BUT
WERE AFRAID TO ASK

A. How Were Charters Born?
The origins of educational reform that led to today's school
choice trace back to the works of Gunnar Myrdal and Milton
Friedman, two influential economists holding diametrically
opposing views. 28 First, the 1944 publication of Gunnar
Myrdal's poignant report, An American Dilemma: The Negro
Problem and Modern Democracy,2 9 led to its ultimate citation
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1954 germinal desegregation
case, Brown v. Board of Education. 30 The year following Brown,
Milton Friedman advocated the concept of public school choice
and asserted that breaking the monopoly of the traditional
public schools and providing parents with options would lead to
an improvement in a failing traditional public school system. 31
Despite Friedman's arguments, states did not implement
public school choice, and 1966's "Coleman Report" 32 and 1983's
A Nation at Risk 33 continued to evidence a broken traditional
public education system. A 1990 Brookings Review article
entitled America's Public Schools: Choice Is a Panacea became
one of the final prominent manifestos prior to the advent of
charters. 34 Panacea predicted that increased spending and
other school experiments were "destined to fail" because, first,

28. See Samuel Brittan, The Not So Noble Nobel Prize, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 19,
2003, (asserting that structural development economist Gunnar Myrdal, a Nobel Prize
recipient, advocated the abolition of the Nobel Prize in economics because the prize had
also been awarded to neoclassical libertarian economists such as Friderich von Hayek
and Milton Friedman).
29. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGHO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (Transaction Publishers 1995) (1944).
30. 347 U.S. 483, n.ll (1954) [hereinafter Brown].
31. See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., Trustees of Rutgers College 1955).
While Friedman's specific idea in this text was aimed at choice through vouchers, as
noted by the Charter School Institute supra note 2, charters are a direct descendant of
Friedman's market-based ideas.
::!2. ,James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE 3 (1966).
33. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE
FO!{ EDUCATIONAL REFORM: A REPORT TO THE NA'l'ION AND THE SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (1983).
34. John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, America's Public Schools: Choice lfi a
Panacea, 8 BROOKINGS REV. 4-12 (1990) [hereinafter Panacea].
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institutional reform needed to unleash markets, and then only
after markets existed would parental choice within these
markets lead to greater student achievement. 35 Panacea
argued "how much students learn is not determined simply by
their aptitude or family background . . . but also by how
effectively schools are organized." 36
Making the case for educational choice and competition,
Panacea asserted that
through democratic control and markets ... American society
makes most of its choices on matters of public importance,
including education. Public schools are subject to direct
control through politics. But not all schools are controlled in
this way. Private schools - representing about a fourth of all
schools are subject to indirect control through markets.
What difference does it make? Our analysis suggests that the
difference is considerable. Schools compete for the support of
parents and students, and parents and students are free to
choose among schools. The system is built on decentralization,
competition, and choice."

[B]ureaucratic control ... [is] simply unnecessary for schools
whose primary concern is to please their clients. 37

In other words, schools in a market based on choice and
competition would be incentivized to become the "organizations
that academics and reformers would [otherwise] like to impose
on the public schools." 38

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. at 5. The educational choice theory was revisited again in 2002, essentially
a decade after the birth of charters, and was recaptured in the milieu of charters as
follows:
According to the theory, choice improves schools through two distinct mechanisms.
The first is through competition. Most charter schools receive the lion's share of
their funding through ... allocations that travel with pupils. If a student chooses
to attend a charter school, that school receives a fixed-sum payment [directly from
the government]. As a consequence, schools that fail to attract and retain students
will, in theory, go out of business. Since charter schools cannot gain a leg up on
competitors by lowering their "prices," they must compete primarily on quality.
Thus, the charter concept postulates that, other things equal, competition for
students will raise the quality of charter schools and that schools failing to
compete on quality will be forced to close.
Second, choice also works through a sorting process. Where there is a wide variety
of schools from which to choose, and where each provides a different mix of
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After this nearly fifty-year narrative provided by academic
research, policy studies, and theorizing, came a counter
narrative from influential urban youths within popular culture
who screamed for positive change in public education. Perhaps
representing a
more modern and widely accepted
representation of James Baldwin's rage, 39 this saga was
articulated by Grammy Award winning artists Rage Against
the Machine, whose angst at the failure of the monopolistic
traditional public education system extant at the time
produced a rage that was
relentless/We need a movement with a quickness .... The
present curriculum/! put my fist in 'em/Eurocentric every last
one of 'em . . . . With lecture I puncture the structure of
lies .... One-sided stories for years and years and years ....
[W]e need to check the interior/Of the system that cares about
only one culture/And that is why/We gotta take the power
back .... The teacher stands in front of the class/But the
lesson plan he can't recall/The student's eyes don't perceive
the lies/Bouncing off every ... wall .... Europe ain't my rope
to swing on/Can't learn a thing from itNet we hang from
it .... Gotta .... [e]xpose and close the doors on those who
try/To strangle and mangle the truth .... 40

Using the words and media of popular culture, Rage
identified to a broad audience the inequitable power, failed
organizational structure, poor pedagogy, inability to shutter
abhorrent schools, and factually erroneous 41 and culturally

services. customers will choose the mix of services that best meets their
educational preferences ... Choice advocates also argue that the very act of choice
will leave students, parents, and teachers disposed to work harder to support the
schools they have chosen.
MIIWN & NELSON, supra note 16, at 5 (references omitted).
:39. Baldwin said: "To be a Negro in this country and to be relatively conscious is
to b;; in a rage almost all the time," and "[e]ducation is indoctrination if you're whitesubjugation if you're black." Nation: Neuro Leaders on Violence, TIME, Aug. 20, 1965,
auailablc at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,841950,00.html; see
also
About.com:
Mrica-American
History,
James
Baldwin
Quotes,
http://afroamhistory.about.com/ocl/jamesbaldwin/a/quotes_baldwin.htm (last visited
Aug. :3, 2009) .•James Baldwin has a traditional public school named after him in New
York City that is forty-four percent black and forty-four percent Latino with 2008 test
scores below both the district (Geographic District #2) and the state. See
Education.com.
200H
Test
Scores,
James
Baldwin
School,
http://www.education.com/schoolfinder/us/new-york/new-york/james-baldwinschool/test-results/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
40. RAm: AnAI:-IST THE MACHINE, Take the Power Bach, on RAGE AGAINST THE
MACHINE (Sony Records 1992).
41. For a discussion of some of the "one-sided stories," "lies," and factually
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irrelevant curriculum. 42 These defects not only were mentioned
in the above studies, but they also constituted the reality for
those individuals who lacked the social capital to choose the
provision of their education. Because existing laws prohibited
competition within public education, they perpetuated the
failings of traditional urban public schools. Charters, which
would permit concepts such as culturally relevant schools,
could indeed become a "movement with a quickness" in which
stakeholders could, in short order, create and attend public
schools of their choice. Charters could enable these changes by
employing market mechanisms to free legions of stakeholders
from the failed traditional urban public schools and to shift the
power, structure, curriculum, and pedagogy that continued to
exist in traditional public schools in the early 1990s in a
different direction.
With these chronicles serving as the historical, theoretical,
and emotional underpinnings that preceded meaningful public
educational choice and competition, Minnesota, in 1991,
became the first state to enact charter-enabling legislation. 43
California followed in 1992. Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Mexico, and Wisconsin enabled charters in
1993, and three more states did so in 1994 (Arizona, Hawaii,
Kansas). Eight states plus the District added charter
legislation in 1995 (Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Texas, Wyoming), six more
states in 1996 (Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and
North and South Carolina), four in 1997 (Mississippi, Nevada,
Ohio, Pennsylvania), five in 1998 (Idaho, Missouri, New York,
Utah, Virginia), two in 1999 (Oklahoma, Oregon), Indiana in
2001, Iowa and Tennessee in 2002, and Maryland in 2003. 44 In

erroneous items that have long been a part of the traditional public education system,
see, e.g., JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES MY TEACHER TOLD ME: EVERYTHING YOUR AMERICAN
HISTORY TEXTBOOK GOT WRONG (Touchstone Publishing 1996)); HOWARD ZINN. A
PEOPLES' HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2005).
42. See, e.g., Gloria Ladsen-Billings, But That's Just Good Teaching! The Case for
Culturally Relevant Pedagogy, 34 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 159-65 (Sum. 1995).
Culturally relevant schools are discussed in greater detail, infra Part II.B.2.
43. See, e.g., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS, supra
note 2, at 1.1.
U.S.
Charter
Schools,
State
By
State
#'s,
44. See
http://www.uscharterschools.org/cs/sp/query/q/1595?x-order=year,state (last visited
Aug. 3, 2009). By process of elimination, the ten states that prohibit charters are:
Maine, Vermont, West Virginia, Kentucky, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota.
Nebraska, Alabama, and Washington.
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little more than a decade, year after year, state after state,
following generation after generation of studies, discussions,
and emotions spurred by the failed monopoly of the traditional
public schools, a massive and unprecedented movement had
occurred in U.S. public education - in a vast majority of the
country, public school choice through charters had become a
reality. That reality became diverse, as legislatures took a
variety of views on multiple types of charter innovation,
including sex-segregated charters. 45

45. For example, New York, Ohio, and Delaware explicitly permit sex-segregated
charters. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(2) (McKinney 2006) (stating that "nothing in this
article shall be construed to prevent the establishment of a single-sex charter school.");
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § .1314.06 (Anderson 2007) (stating that
[t]he governing authority of each community school established under this chapter
shall adopt admission procedures that specify the following: ... (D)(l) That there will
be no discrimination in the admission of students ... except that
[tjhe governing authority may establish single-gender schools ... provided
comparable facilities and learning opportunities are offered for both boys and girls.
Such comparable facilities and opportunities may be offered for each sex at
separate locations).
Delaware's recent legislative history may be instructive relative to a state's view of how
the creation of sex-segregated charters comports with governing law. In March 2008,
the Chair of Delaware's State Council of Persons with Disabilities provided a memo to
the state's legislators regarding Delaware's proposed H.B. 285 concerning single-sex
charters. See Memorandum from Ms. Deniese McMullin-Powell, Chairperson, State
Council for Persons with Disabilities to All Members of the Delaware State Senate and
House of Representatives (Mar. 14, 2008) (stating that in 2007 Delaware's Department
of Education opined that single-sex charters could violate the law but the Chair
supported amending state law to authorize single-sex charters). To assuage legal
concerns, Delaware's HB 285 required, inter alia, the Delaware DOE to establish a sexsegregated charter for the excluded sex within two years and sunset the sex-segregated
school authorization in 2013. Delaware's legislation was proposed in response to an
application to create the "Prestige Academy Charter School," an all-boys school. The
next sex-segregated charter in Delaware must be "substantially equal" to the Prestige
school. DEL. H.B. 285 (2008). In April 2008, Delaware Governor Ruth Ann Minner
signed the legislation into law, thus authorizing single-sex charters in Delaware, and
the Prestige school currently operates. See Single-Gender Charter Schools Bill Signed,
DEL.
NEWS
,J .,
Apr.
22,
2008,
available
at
http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20080422/NEWS03/804220406/Single-gendercharter-school s-bill-signed
Other states such as Arkansas, Arizona, and Colorado are legislatively silent on the
issue. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14.03.250 (Michie 2002); AHIZ. REV. STAT., § 15-184 (2007);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-101 (2002).
In contrast, Connecticut appears to frown upon sex-segregated charters. See CONN.
GEN. STAT.§ 10-16p(f) (2007) (stating that charters are not to
discriminate on th<' basis of race, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
religion, disability, athletic performance or proficiency in the English language,
provided the school may limit enrollment to a particular grade level or specialized
educational focus and, if there is not space available for all students seeking
enrollment. the school may give preference to siblings but shall otherwise
determine enrollment by a lottery).
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B. So Charters May Exist, but Just What Are They?
A charter school is so-called because a charter document
functions as a contract between the state and the school; the
charter document provides a description of the educational
mission and responsibilities of the newly created publicly
financed charter school. 46 The principal investigator of
Harvard's Charter Schools Chartering Practice Project,
Katherine K. Merseth, indicated that
[C]harter schools ... are similar to traditional public schools
in several regards: they receive government funds to operate,
they may not engage in religious instruction, and they are
open to all interested students. These schools are state-level
entities created by state legislatures and therefore subject to
state level performance requirements, state curricular
frameworks, and the federal requirements outlined under
NCLB. 47

1. What Are Charters' Structural Features?
Gary Miron and Christopher Nelson noted that the charter
school model contains "a set of policy changes . . . that alter
the ... environment in which charter schools operate. We call
these 'structural' changes because they seek to fundamentally
alter the conditions under which schools operate." 4R The
organization is "built on decentralization, competition, and
choice." 49 Charters thus created structural change and
provided options through competitive market mechanisms to
public education stakeholders that previously lacked the social
capital to exercise educational choice.
In terms of who may apply for a charter grant, charters
distinguish themselves from traditional public schools because

46. See FREQUEC\ITLY AsKED QUESTIOC\IS ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS, supra note 2,
at 1.1.
47. MERSETH supra note 1, at 3. See also Jim Stergios, Editorial, Gou. Behind the
Curve, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 30, 2009 (stating that a "Boston Foundation report
show[ed] that the city's charters, which significantly outperform district and pilot
schools and educate a higher percentage of African-Americans than district schools, are
bridging the achievement gap," and referencing THE BOSTON FOUC\IDATION, lC\IFORMJN(;
THE DEBATE: COMPARING BOSTON'S CHARTER, PILOT, AND TRADITIONAL SCHOOLS (,Jan.
2009), which was researched and prepared by faculty from Duke University, MIT,
Harvard, and the University of Michigan).
48. MIRON AND NELSON, supra note 16, at 4-5.
49. Chubb and Moe, supra note 34, at 5.
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often "a group of private individuals may open and govern a
charter school, in contrast to traditional schools, which are
typically governed by a publicly elected board or by individuals
appointed by an elected official." 50 If the schools fail to abide by
their charter, or if they produce inappropriate results, the state
can revoke a school's charter. 51 Charters provide a swath of
structural benefits that traditional public schools have not. 52
Examples include, inter alia, longer school days, 53 multi-aged
classrooms, strict discipline policies, lower student/teacher
ratios, 54 summer programs, and more individualized student
attention by teachers, tutors, and assistants. 55 As a result, the
structural differences that charters provide have not been and still are not - provided by the traditional urban public
schools. 56 Charters generally have open enrollment and are not

50. MERSETH, supra note 1, at 3. Because the actual composition of who may
apply for a charter varies from state to state, the U.S. Charter Schools State
Information website provides a tool to compare who may submit a charter application
m
any given state. See US Charter Schools State Information Page,
http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs~docs/splindex.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
51. See, e.g, Andrew Rotherham, The Pros & Cons of Charter School Closures, in
HOPES, FEARS, & HEALITY, A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 2005
13-52 (Robin J. Lake & Paul T. Hill, eds., University of Washington, National Charter
School Research Project 2005).
52. For a detailed analysis of some of the structures and systems associated with
successful charters and how those structures can be replicated, see MERSETH supra
note 1, at 171-196 ("Structures and Systems, Getting Organized for Instruction").
53. See, e.f?., THOMAS DOWNES ET AL., INCOMPLETE GRADE: MASSACHUSETTS
EDUCATION HE FORM AT 15 17 (Massinc. 2009).
54. See, e.g., ARK. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS ~ FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS,
(Jan.
2008),
http://arkansased.org/schools/schools~chartecfaq~answers.html (last visited Aug. 3,
2009) (discussing charters' increased emphasis on citizenship, ethics, and character
education). Rut see OFFICE OF EDUC. HESEARCH & IMPROVEMENT, DEP'T OF EDUC., THE
STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000: FOURTH-YEAR REPORT 17-26 (2000).
55. For example, the MATCH Charter Public High School in Boston requires all
students to attend two hours of daily tutoring, and newly admitted MATCH students
"attend a summer academy each day for five hours, Monday through Thursday, for five
consecutive weeks at ... MIT, for a total of one hundred hours." MERSETH, supra note
1, at 93, 95, 105.
56. Charter competition has, however, spurred some traditional public districts to
lobby for changed laws that would permit traditional public school districts to have
some greater structural flexibility. For example, the Boston Public Schools created the
Boston Pilot Schools in 1995 "to promote increased choice options within the school
district, largely in response to 1993 state legislation creating charter schools." MAss.
DEP'T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., SCH. REDESIGN, available at
http://www.doe.mass.edu/redesign/copilot/guidelines.html?section=all.
Therefore,
before any meaningful empirical studies could be issued on the efficacy of
Massachusetts charters, the traditional public schools felt enough of a competitive
threat by the mere presence of charters that it led to greater choice for Boston
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subject to academic or language-based proficiencies. 57 If at
capacity, students wanting to attend charters may be subject to
lottery restraints or preferences for existing siblings at the
school, "at-risk" students, and students living in the local
neighborhood. 58 Not surprisingly, given the grueling work and
extensive hours required of faculty at some charters and the
ability to terminate poor teachers quickly, 59 teachers' unions
have motives to oppose charters. 60
Charters are funded on per-pupil formulae, with the funds
disbursed by the government directly to the charter or Local
Education Agency (LEA). 61 If a charter is its own LEA, then it
may have "many more programmatic and financial
responsibilities than a school that is only a part of an LEA." 62
The Center for Education Reform (CER) has indicated that an
LEA is required to (1) receive federal education funds, (2)
Assure delivery of acceptable services, (3) assure inclusion of
all qualified students in funded programs, (4) provide training
in compliance with federal laws and regulations, (5) conduct
audits of federally funded programs ... [and] (6) report and

stakeholders.
57. But see lNFOJ{MJNG THE DEBATE, supra note 4 7, Table 4, at Hi (suggesting
that a significantly smaller percentage of students who were Latino or who had limited
English proficiency enrolled in charters or attempted to gain access to charters via a
lottery). Anecdotal speculation suggests that dissemination of the charter option may
have challenges crossing language barriers. As a result, the number of black students
that enroll in charters may be disproportionately high, with the number of Latino
students disproportionately low. Cf. David R. Garcia, Academic and Racial Segregation
in Charter Schools: Do Parents Sort Students into Specialized Charter Schools? 40
EDUC. & URBAN Soc. 590 (2008) (suggesting that some parents have chosen to leave
more racially integrated district schools to attend more racially segregated charters).
58. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 10-66, supra note 45.
59. See PowerPoint: The National Charter School Research Project, University of
Washington's Center on Reinventing Public Education & The Massachusetts Charter
School Dissemination & Replication Project, Harvard Graduate School of Education,
Human Resources & Charter Schools: Hiring, Turnover, & Retention in 7 States, at
Slide 5 (2008) (indicating that charters in Arizona, Texas, California, Rhode Island,
Hawaii, and Massachusetts generally have expanded pools of employee candidates,
offer a match to compelling missions, provide incentive-based compensation, and
dismiss employees for poor performance).
60. See Letter from Dennis Van Roeckel, President, Nat'! Educ. Assoc. et al., to
Arne Duncan, Secretary of Education (Aug. 21, 2009).
61. See e.g., ROBIN JACOBOWITZ & JONATHAN S. GYURKO, CHA!n'Ell SCH. FUND!Nl;
IN N.Y.: PERSPECTIVES ON PARITY WITH TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS, (Mar. 2004).
62. See Primers on Implementing Special Education in Charter Schools,
http://www.uscharterschools.org/cs/spedp/view/sped_aud/4?section=stat (last visited
Aug. 3, 2009).
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respond to state and federal Education Units." 63 Whether a
charter is an LEA is state-dependent. In Massachusetts, for
example, a charter is treated as its own school district or LEA
and maintains its own board. 64 Colorado, however, defines a
charter as a "public, nonsectarian, nonreligious, non-homebased school which operates within a public school district." 65 A
Colorado charter is, therefore, a public school in the district
that grants the charter and is "part of the school district that
approves its charter application and charter contract and ...
accountable to the local board of education pursuant to section
22-30.5-104 (2)." 66 Thus, Colorado charters do not serve as
distinct LEAs, they operate within an existing school district,
and they answer to that district's school board. 67 Further
muddying the issue, states such as New York allow charters to
be considered either as LEAs or as part of the broader district,
depending upon their creation and purpose. 68 Under many
federal guidelines, each LEA has certain obligations. In the
twenty-five states where a charter may constitute its own LEA,
the CER "believes charters should be their own LEAs,"
allowing the charters to "receive federal funds directly," 69
rather than having the funds pass "from the federal
government to the state to the LEA, and finally to the charter
school." 70 Alternatively, "[i]n states where charters are not
LEAs, the local district may keep a portion of the funding to
cover administrative costs, and therefore, the charter school

63. CTR. FOR EIJUC. REFORM, WHY CHARTER SCHOOLS SHOULD BE THEIR OWN
INDEPENDENT LEA 2 ( 2008).
64. See MASS. DEP'T OF ELEMENTAHY AND SECONDARY EDUC., MASSACHUSETTS
PlUMER ON SPECIAL EDUCATION AND CHAI{'fER SCHOOLS, §II, Part II, A, 1 (2009).
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-1 04(1) (2002) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 105-108(5).
67. Having said this, Colorado charters are, however, ultimately administered by
a governing body that is agreed to by both the charter applicant and the local school
board. Id. at 104(4).
68. Sec, e.g., Jacobowitz & Gyurko supra note 61 at n.1 (stating that charters are
entitled to "one hundred percent" of the "expense per pupil," as defined by the Average
Operating Expense/Total Allowable Pupil Units, but charters at times do not receive
the entirety of the funds due to them). In addition, New York charters became their
own LEA for NCLB purposes in 2001 hut are within a school district's LEA for
purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). Id. at 3, Table 1;
see also FHEQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS supra note 2
(indicating that local districts can authorize charters in addition to the two state
authorizing agencies).
69. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 63.
70. ld.
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will receive less money." 71

2. Are Charters Successful, and, if so, Why?
Research shows that charters can be successful relative to
the traditional public schools. Several RAND studies published
in 2009 suggest that charters had "some positive effect on high
school student attainment" 72 and that charter "high school
students had a higher probability of graduating and attending
college." 73 Achievement gaps may be tightened by some high
performing charters. 74 As Merseth stated, "[w]hether one
applies elements of systems theory, the advice of management
gurus, or concepts of organizational congruence, a central
element of high-performing organizations ... evident in these
charter schools is the power of coherence." 75 Charters function
as places where entrepreneurs can create educational models
based on business theory, and, if successful in the marketplace
and in possession of a desire to do so, charters can become
nationally recognized brands. 76 Nineteen years following the
arguments in Panacea, Merseth's and RAND's contemporary
research appears to agree that organizational structures within
educational markets can lead to heightened performance via
successful charters. 77 Simply put, established business doctrine
and accepted economic theory 78 support that an educational

71. Id. at 3.
72. Susan Bodilly, RAND EDUC., THE ROLE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS IN IMPROVINC
EDUCATION (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RR9428/.
73. Jennifer Li, RAND EDUC., ARE CHARTER SCHOOLS MAKING A DIFFERENCE? A
STUDY OF STUDENT OUTCOMES IN EIGHT STATES 1 (2009), available at
http://www .rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9433/ .
7 4. See generally MERSETH supra note 1; INFORMINC THE DERATE, supra note 4 7.
75. MERSETH, supra note 1, at 11. (referencing Deming (2000), Collins (2005),
Drucker (1990), Tushman & O'Reilly (2002), and Nadler & Tushman (1980)).
76. An example of a national charter brand is the KIPP brand, which is an
acronym for "Knowledge Is Power Program." Two of KIPP's founders, Mike Feinberg
and David Levin met in the Teach for America program in 1992 and created their own
educational model that started in 1994 with a single classroom of 50 students. See,
e.g., Stig Leschly, KIPP NATIONAL (A) (ABRIDGED) HARV. Bus. SCH. CASE 9-805-068, at
1·4 (Jan. 13, 2005). As of July 2009, KIPP had 82 schools in 19 states plus the district,
with approximately 20,000 students. See KIPP: Knowledge Is Power Program website,
http://www.kipp.org/ (last visited July 18, 2009).
77. Unlike the predictions in Panacea, however, Merseth appears to have argued
that the micro, more than the macro, organization constitutes a proximate cause of
successful urban charters. See MERSETH supra note 1; Panacea supra note 34.
78. See, e.g., JAMES A. BRICKLEY ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS &
ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 280-505, 599-698 (McGraw- Hill Irwin 4th ed. 2007).
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provider's organizational structure can lead to measurable
differences in students' educational outcomes.
Specific examples of market-based structural and
organizational innovation among charters include schools
whose curricula focus on the performing arts, 79 business and
finance, 80 math and science, 81 science and technology, 82 and the
arts in general. 83 Other charters are more overtly cultural in
their curricular missions. For example, the Academy of the
Pacific Rim Charter Public School m Hyde Park,
Massachusetts, focuses on fusing Asian and Western
cultures. 84 Other charters highlight American Indian culture, 85
while a number of charters are centered on African culture. 86
While culturally conscious in their missions, these schools do
not restrict student admissions based on the school's particular
cultural consciousness. If a parent would like his or her child to
attend that charter, and if sufficient seats exist or,

79. See, e.g., Sequoia Choice - Star Performing Arts Charter in Arizona
http://sequoia.choiceed.org (last visited Mar. 26. 2010).
HO. See, e.g,
Pillar Academy of Business & Finance m
Arizona,
http://www.pillaracademy.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
Ill. See,
e.g.,
Math
and
Science
Success
Academy
m
Arizona,
http://www.amstucson.org/MASSA_info.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
82. Sec,
e.g.,
Arizona
Academy
of
Science
and
Technology,
www.arizonaacademyofscience.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
8.3. Sec, e.g., Arizona School for the Arts, http://goasa.org/index.cfm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2010).
84. S('e Academy of the Pacific Rim, http://www.pacrim.org/our_story.htm (last
visited Aug. 4, 2009).
85. See, e.g., Brian Bielenberg, Charter Schools for American Indians, in LEARN
IN BEAUTY: INDIGENOUS EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 132-151 (Jon Reyhner eta!.
eels .. Northern Arizona University 2000).
86. See, e.g., Roots Public Charter School in Washington, D.C., (stating that
[t]he Mission of Roots Public Charter School is to: Promote and secure the
connection of Mother Africa within our children; Prepare students to break the
chains of psychological conditioning that attempt to keep them powerless in all
phases of society: Provide students with a strong Mrican-centered learning
environment: Guide students toward academic excellence, exemplary character
and social responsibility; Encourage success leading to self-reliance and economic,
social/political contributions to society.).
Roots Public Charter School Mission and Philosophy,
http://www .roots pes .org/School_Philosophy_Mission/school_philosophy_mission. h t
ml (last visited Aug. 3, 2009); the ,Joseph Littles-Nguzo Saba Charter School in West
Palm Beach Florida (indicating that "[o]ur mission is to provide a nurturing and caring
environment where at risk children can learn and be successful through a program of
strong academics, high expectations, values and character building skills that are
based on African culture and tradition"), Mission Statement, Joseph-Nguzo Saba
Charter School, http://www.jlnscs.org/index.php (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
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alternatively, if that student wins a lottery, 87 then that student
may attend that school and learn based on the cultural
missions of these schools, regardless of the student's cultural
background. 88 Having stakeholders, including students, buy
into the schools' desire for stakeholder involvement is an
essential element in erasing many of the tensions and failures
that have plagued urban public education. 89 Unlike traditional
public schools, because charters are schools of choice, charters
invite stakeholder buy-in.
As a result, charter success appears to stem from three
overarching factors: (1) a market that allows for choice and
competition, (2) organizational structures that permit for
coherence without bureaucracy, and (3) buy-in by stakeholders
into a given charter's specific model, including a charter's
specific curricular and pedagogical approach. These three
reasons have tremendously affected student achievement,
particularly with historically underachieving traditional urban
public schools and their students.

3. What Do Charter Caps Mean?
Despite evidence of charter success, restrictions such as
charter caps, which inhibit new charters from forming,
arguably prevent a variety of potentially interested
stakeholders from entering the educational marketplace. 90 As
with all things charter, the rules limiting the number of
charters in a given jurisdiction are a creation of state law, and
their existence has become a contentious issue in recent years.
In 2005, Christiansen and Lake asserted that the variation of
the number of new charter schools "among the states can be
explained by restrictive laws and caps," 91 and by 2009, sixty87. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 10-66 (2007), supra note 45.
88. For example, despite a mission to fuse Asian and Western cultures, the
Academy of the Pacific Rim's student population is 57 percent black, 23 percent white,
16 percent Latino and three percent Asian. MERSETH supra note 1, at 73.
89. See, e.g., Jeff Duncan-Andrade, Gan{?stas, Wankstas, and Ridas: Defining,
Developing, and Supporting Effective Teachers in Urban Schools, 20 INT'L J. OF
QUALITATIVE STUD. TN EDUC., 617 (2007). See also GASTON ALONSO ET AL., OUR
SCHOOLS SUCK: STUDENTS TALK BACK TO A SEGREGATED NATION ON THE FAILURES OF
URBAN EDUCATION 71-112 (New York University Press 2009) (indicating generally that
effective urban educators must get students to buy-into that educator's authenticity,
some of which can be accomplished by having the educators openly accountable to
students).
90. See, e.g., DOWNES, supra note 5.'3.
91. Jon Christensen & Robin J. Lake. The National Charter School Landscape in
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five percent of the states that had charter-enabling legislation
maintained artificial caps on the number of charters. 92 The
National Charter School Research Project argued for lifting
charter caps, asserting not only that room existed "for just 725
more [charter] schools nationwide" 93 but also that charter
waiting lists in states such as New York were part of the
nationwide problem that required charter caps to be lifted. 94
These assertions are inaccurate, however. The first statement
is logically impossible, given that a number of states, including
Pennsylvania and Minnesota, have no charter caps. 95 As a
result, room exists for countless more charters on a national
basis. Moreover, the second assertion is flawed because New
York has not yet hit its cap; in fact, the state authorized a new
sex-segregated charter in June 2009 that is the subject of the
below analysis in Part IV.A. 96
Regardless of whether the number of charters in an area is
at or below a cap, de jure charter caps indeed exist, and they
vary in number and rationale by state. For example, while New
York's legislation limits the formation of new charters, an
unlimited number of existing public schools may convert to
charters. 97 In Arkansas, a similarly unlimited number of
conversions may take place, but new KIPP schools 98 are
explicitly excluded from the cap on new charters, a provision
unavailable to KIPP's competing educational entrepreneurs
who thereby are restricted from creating new charters. 99
Beyond these de jure caps, some states arguably have de facto
caps because the charter approval rests in the hands of the
2007 in HOPES, FEARS, & REALITY: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS
IN 2007 4 (Robin J. Lake ed., Nat'! Charter Sch. Res. Project, Ctr. on Reinventing Pub.
Educ. 2007).
92. Sec Editorial, Blachboard Pulpit: Encouraging the Spread of Charter Schools,
WASH. POST, ,June 22, 2009. Even including the district in the equation as not having a
charter cap, the figure remains over sixty-three percent.
93. Christensen & Lake, supra note 91 at 1.
94. See, e.g., National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, Caps on Charter
Schools, http://www.publiccharters.org/node/45 (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
95. See, e.g., National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, Caps on Charter
Schools, http://www.publiccharters.org/node/45 (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
96. See CHAHTER SCHOOLS INSTITUTE, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF N.Y., SUNY
AUTHORIZED CHARTER SCHOOLS PEHCENT AT PROFICIENCY AS COMPARED TO THE
DISTRICT (Jun. 12, 2009), infra Part V.A.
97. N.Y. EDUC. LAW§ 2852(9) (2006).
98. See discussion of KIPP schools' growth, supra note 76.
99. See, e.g., Indiana and New Hampshire (unlimited only if sponsored by local
school boards); Iowa (one charter per district).
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local district, many of whose teachers may be opposed to the
formation of a competing schoo1. 10 Charter caps, according to
some individuals, are often in place due to the political
influence of the teachers' unions in traditional public schools. 101
Teachers' unions arguably oppose charters because "[g]iven
their self-protective instinct, the teachers unions remain
staunchly opposed to more charters .... [because charters] are
not automatically unionized. Further, some embrace merit pay,
another union bete noire, and charter teachers often work
longer days than those in the traditional public schools." 102 In
June 2009, the Boston Globe indicated that Secretary Duncan
was "no fan of the artificial caps that limit the ability of new
charter schools to open in urban areas where they are most
needed." 103
Whether due to caps or because of some other reason(s), the
number of charter schools in operation today is insufficient for
the current demand. As of mid-2009, waiting lists held an
estimated 365,000 students wanting but unable to be admitted
to charters. 104 This figure indicates that the charter market
currently is insufficiently large and in need of expansion.
Building on the economic principles that provided the
foundation for the charter competition concept, 105 charters
currently exist in a market that is "illiquid." 106 When a market
is illiquid, its participants are unable to recognize an asset's
true or "intrinsic" value. 107 Before realizing an asset's intrinsic

°

100. See, e.g., Scot Lehigh, Op-Ed., A Brave Call for Raisin!{ Charter Caps, BOSTOI'i
GLOBE, May 29, 2009.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Editorial, Take Caps Off Charter Schools, BOSTON GLOBE. ,Jun. 10. 2009; see
also Dumicus, supra note 10.
104. See Blackboard Pulpit, supra note 92.
105. See CHARTER SCH. ]NST., STATE U:--JJV. OF N.Y., FREqUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIO:--JS ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS, 2.2 (2006), supra note 2.
106. James Forman, Jr. indicated that charters existed in a "quasi-market." James
Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emer!{ing Evidence from
Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. tl:i9, (2007) sec
also John Krainer & Stephen F. LeRoy, Equilibrium Valuation of Illiquid Aosets 19 J.
OF ECON. THEORY 223, 223 - 227 (2002) (stating that "immediate completion of
transactions in illiquid markets either is impossible or is attainable only on
disadvantageous terms" and also referencing other defmitions of illiquid markets).
107. See generally Gunnar Myrdal, A Note on ''Accounting Prices" and the Role of
the Price Mechanism in Planning for Development, 68 SW~<:DISH J. OF Eco:--J. 135, 140
(1966) (stating that '"[i]ntrinsic value' is ... defined as the price that would equate the
supply and demand for a particular factor or good, if full 'equilibrium' prevailed.
Equilibrium presupposes a perfect ... market for that factor or good.").
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value, participants in illiquid markets often benefit from
exercising patience and waiting until opportunistic submarkets develop. 108 As opposed to these illiquid markets, few,
if any, stakeholders in urban public education markets get paid
for patience; rather, maintaining the status quo materially
impairs them, differentiating the charter market from other
economic markets. Nonetheless, the number of students
attending charters theoretically should signal to the market at
least part of a charter's value relative to other options. But
because of the charter market's current illiquidity,
stakeholders receive an inadequate number of signals, which
hinders stakeholders' ability to ascertain a charter's relative
value in the greater public education marketplace. Developed
charter markets would increase the quality of signals sent to
stakeholders and provide additional information as to a
charter's intrinsic value. President Obama and Secretary
Duncan appear to recognize that the good in expanding the
current charter marketplace. Secretary Duncan explained that
"the distribution of Race to the Top funds - an incentive grant
program created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act- will include preference to states that ... agree to lift any
existing charter school caps.'' 109 The federal government,
therefore, is providing billions of dollars in financial incentives
for states to remove charter caps and enlarge the charter
marketplace. This inducement to expand charter markets
combined with existing consistent growth in sex-segregated
charters likely will lead to the formation of additional sexsegregated charters and generate a variety of legal challenges.

Ill. TITLE IX AND SEX-SEGREGATED CHARTERS
Title IX states: "No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial

108. See generally Nils H. Hakansson, An Induced Theory of the Firm Under Risk:
The Pure Mutual Fund, 5 J. OF FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 178 (1970).
109. See Jennifer Cohen, Education Secretary Duncan Speaks on the Education
Agenda,
The
New
America
Foundation
Ed
Money
Watch
Blog,
http://www.newamerica.net/blog/ed-money-watch/2009/education-secretary-duncanspeaks-education-agenda-11948 (last visited May 21, 2009).
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assistance." 110 Thus, if a school receives funding from any
federal agency, the school cannot exclude students from any
educational program or activity based on that student's sex,
without a safe harbor provision elsewhere in the legislation. 111
Title IX has not been materially amended since its inception in
1972. 112 Applying Title IX to sex-segregated charters is
challenging due to the lack of clarity in the statute's language,
legislative history, and judicial interpretation. While
admissions policies that segregate students based on sex at
non-vocational public schools may ostensibly appear to be
exempted from Title IX's applicability, 113 at least one federal
court has indicated that
The limitation on Title IX's applicability to admissions
policies of public elementary and secondary schools was added
to the Senate version of the bill immediately prior to its
passage. A House Amendment to the Senate version explicitly
covered the admissions policies of such schools, requiring that
they convert to coed status within seven years of the bill's
passage. The conference committee considering these
provisions adopted the Senate version which according to
[Indiana] Senator [Birch] Bayh was intended to allow
continued single sex admissions by existing institutions." 114

In addition to relying on Senator Bayh, the Garrett court
stated that regardless of whether Title IX exempted admissions
denials by non-vocational sex-segregated schools, the statute
still did not preclude protections of benefits and services based
on students' sex. 115 Practically speaking, the district court thus
indicated that schools would not be able to segregate students
based on sex, regardless of an admissions clause that courts
can read narrowly.
To avoid a Garrett-like problem in the future, a provision in
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
111. These exceptions include, for example, religious schools and the YMCA. See
generally 20 U.S. C. § 1681(a)(3)(2006), 1681(a)(6)(B) (2006).
112. See amendments to Title IX, Aug. 21, 1974, subsection (a)(4), (a)Ui), and~ (6);
Oct. 12, 1976, subsection (a)(5), and~~ (6)-(9).
113. Title IX applies only to admissions policies at "institutions of vocational
education, professional education, and graduate higher education and to public
institutions of undergraduate higher education. 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a). As a result, this
language ostensibly appears to exempt sex-segregated admissions policies at nonvocational public schools from Title IX's coverage.
114. Garrett v. Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 n.8 (E. D. Mich.
1991) (referencing Sen. Rep. 92-604; see also discussion of Garrett, infra Part IV. C.
115. Id. at 1009.
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NCLB stated that federal funds may be available to LEAs for
"innovative assistance programs," including, inter alia,
"[p]rograms to provide same-gender schools and classrooms
(consistent with applicable law)." 116 NCLB required the DOE to
issue guidelines relative to LEAs attempting to receive funding
for sex-segregated schools and classrooms within 120 days of
NCLB's passage. 117 The DOE obliged by indicating that it
"intended to propose amendments" to its regulations
implementing Title IX. 118 The DOE proposed its amendments
in 2004, 119 and following a notice and comment period, the
DOE published its amended regulations to Title IX in 2006. 120
A federal district court relied on two DOE Office for Civil
Rights ("OCR") rulings that negated sex-segregated public

116. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(23) (2009) (emphasis added). When NCLB was enacted,
"applicable law" included the U.S. Constitution, and when Congress passed NCLB,
"applicable law" included, inter alia, Title IX. The original language proposed for this
section by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson used a "comparability" standard, rather
than a "substantial equality" standard. Attorneys at the National Women's Law Center
("NWLC"), a supporter of sex-segregated schooling, opposed the comparability
standard, because they believed that it retreated from the "substantial equality"
standard set forth in United States v_ Virginia ("VMF'), 518 U.S. 515, 554
(1996)(discussed infra Part II.D.) and Sweat v. Painter, 3:39 U.S. 629, 633 (1950). See
Rosemary Salamone, The Legality of Single-Sex Education in the United States:
Sometimes "Equal" Means "Different," in GENDER PoL'Y & PRACT. 65 (Amanda Datnow
& Lee Hubbard eds. (2002)). Leslie Annexstein, senior counsel for the NWLC, stated
that using the word '"comparable' would change the legal standard and turn the clock
back to the time when boys had better schools than girls[,]" because in VMI both the
district and appeals courts found Virginia's proposed separate all-female academy to be
"substantially comparable," and thus constitutional. See, e.g., Cindy Richards, Public
Funds for Experimental Single-Sex Ed~, WOMEN'S ENEWS, June 29, 2000, available at
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/160/context/archive.; Discussion of
VMI, infra Part II.D.
117. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(c) (2009).
118. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 31097, 31098 (proposed May 8,
2002) (intending that they be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt 106).
119. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11275, 11277-11279 (proposed
Mar. 9, 2004) (intending that they be codified at 34 C.F.R pt. 106).
120. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62529, 62530 (ultimately codified
at 34 C.F.R pt. 106). The DOE noted that
Because the scope of the Title IX statute differs from the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause, these reftulations do not regulate or implement constitutional
requirements or constitute advice about the U.S. Constitution. Rather, they
implement Title IX .... Recipients may wish to consult legal counsel regarding
how the Equal Protection Clause ... may affect any particular single-sex school
71 Fed Reg. 625:1:3 (emphasis added).
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schools; 121 however those OCR rulings were issued prior to the
2006 DOE Regulations. 122 The OCH would likely not arrive at a
similar interpretation under the 2006 DOE Regulations,
because they provide that only charters that fail to operate as a
single-school LEA must give students of the excluded sex a
"substantially equal single-sex school or coeducational
school." 123 Single-school LEA sex-segregated charters are,
therefore, immune from providing a substantially equal
education to the excluded sex under the 2006 DOE
Regulations.
Taking the case of a charter that is not a single-school LEA
and given the varied characteristics that make charters
unique, imagining how a sex-segregated charter would be
substantially equal to a coeducational school in the same LEA
is challenging. The single-school LEA distinction is particularly
critical in states that are already charter-capped or where the
broader LEA provides no other sex-segregated option. Under
some states' charter-enabling legislation, 124 certain sexsegregated charters may violate the second safe harbor
qualification relative to Title IX sex-segregated admissions,
because the charter-enabling legislation in those states does
not consider a charter to be a single-school LEA. Instead, these
charters operate under state law within an existing local school
district and not as a single district LEA under state law. 125
Because charter legislation in those states does not consider
charters to be single district LEAs, these charters are part of
the greater local district and appear to violate Title IX as
interpreted by the DOE 2006 Regulations. Further, while the
DOE altered its Title IX regulations in response to NCLB, Title

121. Garrett v. Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, at 1010 n. 9 (E. D. Mich.
1991).
122. ld.
123. C.F.R. § 106.34(c)(1)-(2) (2005); "A nonvocational public charter school that is
a single-school local educational agency under State law may be operated as a singlesex charter school without regard to the requirements in paragraph (c)(1) of this
section." In determining "substantial equality," for charters that are not their own
LEA, the DOE will consider "the policies and criteria of admission. the educational
benefits provided, including the quality, range, and content of curriculum and other
services and the quality and availability of books, instructional materials, and
technology, the qualifications of faculty and staff, geographic accessibility, the quality.
accessibility, and availability of facilities and resources provided to the class. and
intangible features, such as reputation of faculty." Id. at 106.3(b)(3).
124. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1; Colorado, supra notes 65-67.
125. Id.

2]

UNCHARTERED TERRITORY

333

IX required each U.S. government agency that provides
financial assistance to schools to maintain rules or regulations
interpreting that agency's application of Title IX. 126 Seizing on
this inconsistency, a recent federal district court complaint
noted that a number of U.S. government agencies that grant
financial assistance to educational service providers never
modified their existing Title IX regulations, including the
Department of Health and Human Services 127 (providing head
start funding) and the Department of Agriculture 12 R (providing
free and reduced schoollunches). 129
So what does Title IX mean besides confusion for sexsegregated
charters?
First,
judicial
and
regulatory
interpretation to date indicate that charters should probably
avoid relying on the literal text of Title IX and should not
assume that their admissions policies will insulate them from
adhering to Title IX merely because the charter is nonvocational. Second, sex-segregated charters should understand
their position as an LEA under state law, and those charters
that are not single-school LEAs must provide a substantially
equivalent education to the excluded sex. Third, even if a
126. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2009).
127. A.N.A. v. United States, No. :3:08-cv-00004-CRS (W.D. Ky. filed May 19,
2008). In addition. 45 C.F.R. § 86.::34 generally states that "a recipient shall not provide
any course or otherwise carry out any of its education program or activity separately on
the basis of sex, or require or refi.Ise participation therein by any of its students on such
basis."
128. Sec 7 C.F.R. § 15a.34, which indicates that "a recipient shall not provide any
courst• or otherwise carry out any of its education program or activity separately on the
basis of sex, or require or refuse participation therein by any of its students on such
basis."
129. Rt•presenting the plaintiffs in A.N.A., the ACLU also identified the
Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S.
Department of Energy, the U.S. Small Business Administration, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the
Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, the U.S. Department of Defense, the National Archives, the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S.
Department of Interior, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National
Science Foundation, the Corporation for National and Community Service, and the
U.S. Department of Transportation as not having changed their regulations
interpreting Title JX. A.N.A. (W.D. Ky.) at ~ 44 (referencing 6 C.F.R. § 17.415; 10
C.F.R. § 5.415; 10 C.F.R. § 1042.415; 1:3 C.F.R. § 11:3.415; 14 C.F.R. § 1253.415; 18
C.F.R. § 1317.415; 22 C.F.R. § 146.415; 22 C.F.R. § 229.415; 22 C.F.R. § 3.415; 28
C.F.R. § 54.415; 29 C.F.R. § :36.415; :31 C.F.R. § 28.415; 32 C.F.R. § 196.415; :36 C.F.R. §
1211.415: :iS C.F.R. § 2:3.415; 40 C.F.R. § 5.415; 4:3 C.F.R. § 41.415; 44 C.F.R. § 19.415;
45 C.F.R. § 618.415: 45 C.F.R. § 2555.415; and 49 C.F.R. § 25.415).
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charter is a single-school LEA, if that school accepts funding
from federal departments besides the DOE, then that charter
may still violate other federal agencies' Title IX regulations.
Moreover, despite the DOE's recent changes to its Title IX
regulations, Title IX itself has not changed. Consequently,
given its historical interpretation by courts and agencies,
material challenges remain for sex-segregated charters to live
peacefully with Title IX, regardless of recent, and arguably
immaterial, legislative ("consistent with existing law") and
regulatory (one agency, the DOE) action.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL UNDERPINNINGS
When assessing the constitutionality of the government's
actions, courts use three levels of review, depending upon the
individual or group affected by the government's acts. First,
"Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even
if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their
grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory
classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be
conceived to justify them." 130 Therefore, so long as the
government's acts are rationally related to some governmental
interest, courts defer to the governmental action. This
proposition is commonly known as the "rational basis" test.
Greater scrutiny exists, however, for cases involving
fundamental rights or suspect classes, and the second level is
intermediate scrutiny, which has developed since the early
1970s to apply to cases in which the government's act classifies
people based on their sex. 131 Under the intermediate scrutiny
standard, for the government's sex-based classification to
survive a constitutional challenge, the government must prove
a substantial relationship to an important governmental
interest, and, m educational contexts, the sex-based
classification
requires
an
"exceedingly
persuasive
justification." 132 Third is strict scrutiny, which the court applies
to cases in which the government makes classifications
generally based on race or religion. 133 For a government act to
130.
131.
132.
518 U.S.
133.

McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs. 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
See infra note 147.
See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan (Hogan), 458 U.S. 718, 718 (1982); VMI,
515 (1996).
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 4:38 U.S. 265 (1978).
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pass strict scrutiny, the government's classification must be
necessary to further a compelling government interest. 134 Less
than a handful of federal, let alone Supreme Court, cases
address the issue of sex-segregation in public education, with
essentially only one Supreme Court case at the K-12 level (and
that case without written opinion), and two at the postsecondary level. Because sex-segregated charters receive public
funding through a legislated school choice program, and
because such charters trigger a sex-based classification,
knowledge of the following six cases should prove helpful in
understanding how a court may craft a standard against which
to judge a sex-segregated charter.

A. Vorchheimer

Vorchheimer u. School District of Philadelphia 135
("Vorchheimer") involved sex-segregated schooling at the K-12
level. Vorchheimer wound its way through the courts during
the same time that the Supreme Court was developing its
intermediate level of review. In the mid-1970s, the public
schools in Philadelphia had separate high schools for boys and
girls, with the girls' academy clearly inferior. 136 A girl was
denied admission to attend the all boys school and sued. In
1975, the district court stated that "the outcome of this case
depends on which standard of review is applied," 137 and noted
the development of a new treatment by the Court of sex-based
classifications, and "the net effect of which has been to take
classifications based on sex out of the province of the 'rational
relationship' standard and to place them in a new and
unchartered territory, possibly uninhabited by any other
classification." 13 X The district court knew the difficult position
in which it found itself, remarking that "[a] lower court faced
with this line of cases has an uncomfortable feeling, somewhat
similar to a man playing a shell game who is not absolutely
sure there is a pea." 139 The district court ultimately applied a

]:34. Jd.
1:35. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 400 F. Supp. 326, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
reu'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703
(1977).
136. See discussion infra note 145.
137. Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 334.
13H. Jd. at 3:35.
139. Jd. at :H0-341. The cases examined by the district court included Reed v.
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test that looked to see "whether a 'fair and substantial'
relationship" existed between sex-segregation and the "School
Board's legitimate interests," 140 and determined that
impermissible sex discrimination existed. On appeal, however,
in March 1976, the third circuit found that the presence "in a
system otherwise coeducational of a limited number of singlesex high schools" 141 was permissible, so long as enrollment was
voluntary and the educational opportunities provided were
essentially equal. As in the district court case, the third
circuit's opinion occurred prior to the Court's December 1976
declaration in Craig v. Boren 142 ("Craig") of an intermediate
level of scrutiny establishing that classifications by sex "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to [the] achievement of those
objectives." 143 Just two months after Craig, in February 1977,
the Court oddly affirmed the third circuit - by an equally
divided vote- with no published opinion. 144 The Philadelphia
policy was revisited in state court several years later, having
been brought under state law claims, and the state court ruled
that the schools violated the state constitution and that
Vorchheimer was based on "incomplete facts and evidence." 145
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (first establishing that sex-based classifications were suhjPct
to scrutiny), Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (197:i), Kahn v. Shevin. 416 U.S.
351 (1974), Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975), and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
140. Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 343.
141. Vorchheimer, 532 F. 2d at H81. The third circuit indicated that each of the
cases cited by the district court involved "an actual deprivation or loss of a benefit to a
female which could not be obtained elsewhere." Id. at HH6. ThP third circuit reasonPd
that none of those cases concerned a situation in which equal opportunity was extended
to each sex or in which the restriction applied to both sexes. Significantly, none of those
cases occurred in an educational setting. Id. at 886.
142. 129 U.S. 190 (1976).
143. Id. at 197 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (referencing the majority opinion).
144. Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. 703.
145. Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 9 Phila. 556 (1983), af('d on other wounds. 478
A. 2d 1352 (Pa. Super Ct. 1984). The state trial court indicated that
the Vorchheimer court was not provided with many relevant available data. or was
provided with only tentative and incomplete facts and evidence. Specifically.
incomplete or no evidence was presented as to the following facts: Girls High
students attend classes at Central High (thus undermining the conclusion that
"adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools"): Central High
graduates (who have passed all major subjects above ninth grade) arc> awarded
Bachelor of Arts degrees, whereas Girls High graduates receive high school
diplomas; there are 2. 7 times more Ph.D.'s and l.fi times more teachers with 21
years (or more) of teaching experience at Central High; Central High's campus is
almost three times larger; Central High's library not only contain,.; 50.000 volumes
(a fact brought out in Vorchheimer) hut Girls High's library contains almost fifty
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B. Hogan
The Court reviewed a public university's sex-segregated
admissions policy in 1981 when a man was denied admission to
a state nursing school because of his sex, in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan 146 ("Hogan"). Justice O'Connor
wrote the Court's majority opinion and stated that "the party
seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the
basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification," and
that "burden is met only by showing at least that the
classification serves 'important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives."' 147 Using that
test, the Court struck down the public university's sexsegregated admissions program. The Court also stated that
"although the State recited a 'benign, compensatory purpose,' it
failed to establish that the alleged objective is the actual
purpose underlying the discriminatory classification." 148 In
Hogan, the state failed to establish the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" needed to sustain the sex-based classification, and
the school's admissions policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 149

percent fewer volumes at 26,:100; the library room and setting at Central High are
appreciably more aesthetic; Central High has more instructional equipment,
including a separate computer room; both Central High and Girls High offer
courses. as well as some dub activities, that are not available at the other;
additional prerequisites for AP Chemistry and AP Physics are imposed upon Girls
High students hut not Central High students; Girls High students almost
invariably score lower than Central High students in testing on the Preliminary
Scholastic Aptitude Test/National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test, as well as on
the Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT"); whereas 91.8'Y,, of Central High students are
accepted into college, four percent less or 87.8% of Girls High students are so
accepted; Central High students were beneficiaries (at least in 1979) of 1.2 million
dollars in college scholarships, whereas Girls High students were beneficiaries of
less than half that sum at one- half million dollars; the option of "contract gym",
while available to Central High students, is not granted to Girls High students;
while students attending Central High have been beneficiaries of some $382,145
over a twelve-year period from the Barnwell Foundation, students at Girls High
are excluded therefrom, the latter group engaging in annual magazine
subscription sales to gain funding.
Newberg, 9 Phila. at 564-566 (citations omitted).
146. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
147. Ho{;an, 4.~8 U.S. at 724 (citations omitted) (referencing Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981), Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979), and
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
148. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 7:30.
149. Id. at 7.'31.
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C. Garrett
Ten years following Hogan, Detroit attempted to establish a
number of all-male Afrocentric K-12 schools "in response to the
crisis facing African-American males manifested by high
homicide, unemployment, and drop-out rates." 150 Applying the
second prong of the Court's Hogan test, the Garrett court found
"no evidence that the educational system is failing urban males
because females attend schools with males. In fact, the
educational system is also failing females." 151 While the Garrett
court stated that attempting to help urban male students
constituted an important governmental objective, no evidence
existed that "the presence of girls in the classroom bears a
substantial relationship to the difficulties facing urban
males." 152 Because Garrett was a district court opinion, it may
be instructive, but the decision is binding only in the eastern
district of Michigan.

D. VMI
The most recent guidance from the Supreme Court relative
to sex-segregated admissions policies by government schools
occurred in 1996's VMI 153 decision. In a majority opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg, 154 the VMI court stated that it
will take a "strong presumption that gender classifications are
invalid" 155 and quoted Hogan, reiterating that "[p]arties who
seek to defend gender based government action must
demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification"' 156 for
that action. Further, the government's justification must "be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation," 157 and "must not rely on overbroad generalizations
150. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1007.
151. !d. at 1008.
152. !d. at 1007.
153. VMI, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
154. Prior to becoming a member of the Court, Justice Ginsburg founded the
ACLU's Women's Rights Project. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION: 'l'RIIlUTE: THE
LEGACY
OF
RUTH
BADER
GINSBURG
&
THE
WRP
STAFF
(2006),
http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/gen/24412pub20060307.html (last visited Aug. :i,
2009). The ACLU's Women's Rights Project filed the complaint challenging a sex·
segregated Kentucky public school in A.N.A. supra notes 127, 129.
155. VMI, 518 U.S. at 532 (quoting concurrence of Kennedy, J., in .J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex. rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994).
156. !d. at 524 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
157. !d. at 533 (citations omitted).
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about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females." 158 Even if the government's objectives are
genuine, however, the Court did "not question the
Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse
educational opportunities. We address specifically and only an
educational opportunity recognized by the District Court and
the Court of Appeals as 'unique.'" 159 A constitutionally
consistent solution, however, can include offering the excluded
sex a comparable alternative. 160 While Justice Scalia dissented
that "[t]he rationale of today's decision is sweeping .... [and]
ensures that single-sex education is functionally dead," his
prediction appears to have been incorrect, as evidenced by the
exponential growth in sex-segregated public schools across the
U.S. in the past decade. 161

E. Zelman - School Choice
Recognizing that two distinct constitutional analyses are
involved when comparing claims of governmental classes based
on sex and race or religion, 162 the Court's majority in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris 163 ("Zelman") nonetheless merits discussion
for two reasons. First, it is a relatively recent decision by the
Court involving K-12 education. Second, it involved the flow of

15H. ld.
159. ld. at 534 n.7 (citations omitted).
160. ld. at 529 (citing U.S. v. Va., 44 F.:id 1229, 1241 (4 1h Cir. 1995)) (Phillips, J.
dissenting). Tht> comparability standard and other potential solutions offered by the
VMI court are discussed in Part V.A-B, infra. See also the VMI majority's discussion of
"substantial equality" as a part of the comparability test, infra notes 219, 232.
161. According to NASSPE, the number of public schools offering single-sex
classrooms in the U.S. rose from 11 in 2002 to over 400 in 200H. Nat'! Assoc. for Single
Sex
Pub.
Educ.,
Schools
with
Single-Sex
Classrooms,
http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-schools.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
162. Precedent exists for segregated schools to pass strict scrutiny. See Hunter v.
Regents ("Hunter"), 190 F.3d 106 (1999), cert. denied 69 U.S.L.W. 3110 (U.S. Oct. 2,
2000). In Hunter, when a student was denied admission to a public elementary school
because of her race, her parents sued. However, the school was conducted as a research
lab by UCLA's Graduate School of Education, and because of the elementary school's
mission was to research and develop effective techniques for use in urban public
schools. the use of race in the school's admissions process survived strict scrutiny. The
court indicated that the state had a compelling interest in providing effective education
to a diverse population, the use of race in admissions was narrowly tailored to produce
research results that could he used to improve education in the state, and the school
did not admit students solely on the hasis of a single race; the researchers achieved a
desired diverse population. But see Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007), discussed in Part IV.F, infra.
163. Zelman v. Simons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (5-4 decision).
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taxpayer funds that were directed to schools - including sexsegregated private schools 164 based on the number of
students exercising an option to attend that school under a
school choice program. Ohio was sued over its voucher
program, which allowed financially qualified students (relative
to the poverty line) 165 to obtain a check or voucher from
taxpayer funds from the state. The voucher recipient could
then endorse the voucher to any approved school, public or
private, 166 and attend the private school. 167 In a decision in
which six separate opinions were published, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion holding that Ohio's
voucher program did not violate the establishment clause. 168
A recent argument asserted that charters may survive
strict scrutiny and discriminate based on religion, due to the
Court's "private-choice" doctrine. 169 This argument asserted,
first, because charters are a creation of school choice, and
individual choices are a condition precedent to any funds
flowing to the schools, charters do not sufficiently entangle the
school and government. 170 The argument next stated that the
requirement of an intermediate step (i.e., the presentation of a
check by a parent, rather than by the government, to a sexsegregated or religious school) in the flow of funding may be
viewed as immaterial, and direct funding (charters) and
indirect funding (voucher schools) is a distinction without a

164. See, e.g., EDCHOICE PARTICIPATING PRIVATE SCHOOLS, OH. 0EP'T OF EDUC. 6
(2009) (including St. Xavier, an all-boys Jesuit high school in Cincinnati, Ohio, Seton
High School, an all-girls Catholic school, also in Cincinnati). St. Xavier Admissions,
http://www.stxavier.org/page.cfm?p=4 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) ("Young men from
more than 100 grade schools throughout Greater Cincinnati come to St. X's 110-acre
campus and leave to populate the world as men with a genuine sense of homE~ and
belonging."); Seton High School, History of Seton, bttp://www.setoncincinnati.org/
about/history/ ("Seton has maintained a strong commitment to academic excellence by
offering a comprehensive curriculum to the young women of Western Cincinnati").
165. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3313.978(A) (Anderson 2006).
166. Id. § 3313.976.
167. Assuming the student met the certain other admissions requirements of the
school.
168. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (5-4 decision).
169. Note, Church, Choice, and Charters: A New Wrinkle for Public Education?,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1750 (2009).
170. ld. at 1759-62, 1768-69. The Zelman majority stated that "'no reasonable
observer' would interpret the indirect flow of funds from the government to religious
institutions via a series of individual choices as 'carr[ying] with it the imprimatur of
government endorsement."' ld. at 1761, 1768-79 (quoting Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655)
(citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 817-18 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
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difference. 171 Thus, this argument concluded that because the
funding mechanism of charters is sufficiently similar to
voucher schools, charters may be equally insulated from being
viewed as having the government's imprimatur.
But that argument is incomplete and misleading. The
Zelman majority explicitly articulated its school choice funding
rationale when it said that "[t]he incidental advancement of a
religious mission, or the perceived [government] endorsement
of a religious message, is [constitutionally permissible when it
is] reasonably attributable to the individual [funding] recipient,
not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of
benefits." 172 The government's role does not end with the
disbursement of benefits to charters. Instead, when the
government disburses funds to charters, its role is "just getting
warmed up," as actor Al Pacino memorably barked in a movie
concerning a sex-segregated high school. 173 With charters, the
government authorizes, re-authorizes, oversees, and is
empowered to shutter every aspect of the very schools to which
it distributes the funds. The entirety of the charter's
operation-every computer or desk purchased, every teacher's,
counselor's,
principal's,
nurse's,
aide's,
and janitor's
employment and compensation can be funded entirely by the
government. 174 Nearly every action of these employeeswhether in a class, hallway, club, sport, dance, or other
activity-has the direct imprimatur of the state, as does every
curricular choice or pedagogical method that the charter uses.
Countless of these acts, whether tortuous or otherwise, could

171. The argument asserted that "a plurality in Mitchell v. Helms expressly
disclaimed the significance of an intermediate step in the flow of funding from
government to religious schools, finding that respondents' reliance on a 'direct/indirect
distinction to require that any aid be literally placed in the hands of schoolchildren
rather than given directly to the school for teaching those same children' was an
exercise in empty formalism, which 'breaks down in the application to real-world
programs."' Church, Choice, and Charters, supra note 169 at 1768-69.
172. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added).
178. Pacino won an Academy Award as best male actor in a leading role for his
performance in SCENT OF A WOMAN (Universal Pictures 1992), http://www.imdb.com/
name/nm0000199/awards (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
174. A number of charters receive some degree of private support from charitable
foundations and individuals, but that support is a supplement to the state funding
needed for operation and does not constitute anywhere near a majority of a charter's
funding.
See,
e.g.,
MATCH
Charter
Public
High
School,
Donate,
http://www.match,;chool.org/getinvolved/donate.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
Therefore, public funds may, but do not have to, fund a charter's operations in their
entirety.

342

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2010

result in legal action against the state. The same simply cannot
be said about private schools that accept voucher funds.
Only a small portion of the operations of a private school
that accepts vouchers will be financed by funds coming from
the state. In Zelman, the choice to use the publicly funded
vouchers was granted to a limited number of students who
were (a) in failing districts and (b) demonstrating financial
need relative to the poverty line. And unless some perverse
version of Lake Woebegone exists where all of an area's
children are in failing schools and showing a below average
financial position, unlike voucher choice, all students 175 in a
given area are eligible to attempt to enroll in a charter. Private
schools that receive public funds via vouchers have only a
single connection to the state - receipt of a modest amount of
public funds; charters are intertwined with the government
continuously. Although the private choice cases indeed involved
school choice and public funds within K-12 education, charters
cannot be considered anything but public schools; as a result,
the private choice cases are irrelevant to further discussion and
analysis.

F. Parents Involved- Segregation
Lastly, the 2007 racial segregation case of Parents Involved
v. Seattle School District No. 1 176 is also instructive, because
the VMI court indicated that the Court's prior opinions in
racial segregation cases could be used as a basis for analyzing
sex-segregation cases. The VMI majority ruled that Virginia
failed to provide females with a "substantially equal" education
that was "in line with [the Court's holding in] Sweatt [v.
Painter]." 177 In Sweatt, Texas created two racially segregated
law schools because the state did not want to admit students of
color to its all-white University of Texas Law School. The VMI
court applied the Court's racial segregation analysis in the
context of the sex-segregation case before it. The VMI majority
stated that "the [Sweatt] Court emphasized [that more
important than tangible features], are 'those qualities which
are incapable of objective measurement but which make for

175. Excluding those students who are rejected because of a sex-segregated
admissions policy.
176. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
177. VMI. 518 U.S. at 554 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, ::Ja9 U.S. 629, 6:1::3 (1950)).
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greatness' in a school, including 'reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the
alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige."' 178 Whether based on race or sex, the VMI majority
would therefore apply these same factors of equality to both
types of segregation. Because (1) the VMI majority had
indicated that its rationales in racial segregation cases such as
Sweatt were applicable to sex-segregation cases such as VMI,
(2) Parents Involved dealt with segregation in K-12 public
education, and (3) Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority
opinion (giving insight as to how both he and Justice Alita as
two of the newer members of the Court approach segregation
issues), Parents Involved may help to provide an analytic for
approaching sex-segregated charters. 179 Just as using sexsegregated admissions policies involve the binary of male and
female, in Parents Involved, Seattle's public schools used only
the binary white/non-white racial classifications as a tiebreaker to assign students to various high schools. 180 The
Parents Involved majority rejected Seattle's binary racial
segregation plan as unconstitutional, quoting from Brown:
"'The impact [of segregation] is greater when it has the
sanction of law.'" 181 In striking down Seattle's public school
binary segregation plan, the Parents Involved majority stated
that
race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve
"exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints[;]" race, for some students, is determinative
standing alone. The districts argue that other factors, such as
student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their
plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is
decisive by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with
others in reaching a decision ... the plans here "do not provide
for a meaningful individualized review of applicants" but

178. ld. at 554 (citing Sweatt. 339 U.S. at 634).
179. Having said that, because as in Zelman, the Justices published six opinions in
Parents Involved, its instructive value is complex and arguably tenuous.
180. Parents Involved at 724 (stating that "under the Seattle plan, a school with 50
percent Asian-American students and 50 percent white students but no AfricanAmerican, Native-American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced, while a
school with 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent
Latino, and 20 percent white students would not.").
181. /d. at 746 (quoting Brown v. Ed. of Educ. at 494) (citations omitted) (brackets
in original).
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instead rely on racial classifications in a "nonindividualized.
mechanical" way. 1x2

At the end of the majority opinion, Chief ,Justice Roberts
wrote succinctly: "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 1X3
Assuming that the Court continues to extrapolate its rationale
from public school racial segregation cases to public school sexsegregation cases as it did in VMI, and given that some
charters segregate students based on a binary, as in Parents
Involved, because sex-segregated charters' admissions policies
rely on classifications in a "nonindividualized, mechanical"
way, 184 these charters' policies beg for equal protection clause
challenges.

V. THE COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE TESTS APPLIED TO
A NEW YORK SEX-SEGREGATED CHARTER

Because a charter is a public school, it is a state actor
subject to equal protection clause challenges. In matters
involving public education, the Court historically has deferred
to the states. 185 This judicial deference that benefits charters in
general, however, shifts to a "skeptical scrutiny" 186 when public
schools apply sex-based classifications. Therefore, a state actor
must produce an exceedingly persuasive justification to

182. !d. at 723 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
183. !d. at 748.
184. Id. at 723.
185. The Supreme Court has stated: (1) "education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments," (Brown v. Ed. of Educ. of Topeka. :i47 U.S.
483, 493 (1954)); (2) "[p]roviding public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of
a State," Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 21.3 (1972); (3) courts "lack ... experience"
that "counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at
the state and local levels," San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42
(1973); (4) "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools .... " Millikin v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974);
(5) "[t]he very comp]P.xity of the problems of ... managing a statewide public school
system suggests that 'there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method
of solving them,' and that, within the limits of rationality, 'the legislature's efforts to
tackle the problems' should be entitled to respect," San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411
U.S. at 42 (1973) (quoting ,Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-547 (1972)); and (6)
public schools are "'a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government,"' Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Sch. Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, ,J., concurring)).
Such deference by the Court is a strong positive signal for continued charter expansion
and general innovation.
186. VMI, 518 U.S. at 531.
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maintain the sex-segregated education. Reviewing the
constitutionality of all sex-segregated charters is beyond the
scope of this Article's analysis. New York, nonetheless, serves
as a compelling study of sex-segregated charters because the
state (a) legislatively authorized the creation of sex-segregated
charters, (b) currently has sex-segregated charters in
operation, and (c) has articulated transparently its important
government objectives in authorizing these charters and how it
believes its sex-segregated policies are substantially related to
those objectives. As a result, New York presents strong policy
and legislative arguments alongside transparent decisionmaking in favor of sex-segregated charters that can be
analyzed under the equal protection clause.

A. Background on University Prep and the General Equal
Protection Test
In June 2009, New York approved a sex-segregated charter
to operate in the city of Rochester. The state approved the
University Preparatory Charter School for Young Men
("University Prep"), and the school is scheduled to open in
September 2010. 187 Structurally, University Prep anticipates
providing an extended school day and year[,] ... daily time
for
individualized
learning
support
called
QuadE
(enrichment, enhancement, expansion or exploration)[,] ...
daily time for guided study to allow students to obtain
homework support, study groups, and academic support
services[,] . . . a mentor from the community for each
student[,] ... and daily advisory or crew time to allow for
consistent support and guidance among a small group of 1012 students. 188

Similar to Boston's nationally ranked MATCH Charter
Public High School, 189 University Prep "plans to hold a summer
institute each year to orient new students." 190 Moreover, the
187. CHARTER SCHOOLS INSTITUTE, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK,
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS, APPLICATION TO ESTABLISH THE
UNIVERSITY PltEPARATORY CHARTER SCHOOL FOR YOUNG MEN 5 (Jun. 12,
2009)[hereinafter UPREP SUMMARY].
188. UPREP SUMMARY at 2.
189. See The Top of the Class: The Complete List of the 1,500 Top U.S. High
Schools, Newsweek Web Exclusive, June 8, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201160
(last visited Aug. 3, 2009) (ranking MATCH 85th in the U.S. for 2009).; see also
discussion of MATCH, supra note 55.
190. UPREP SUMMARY, at 2.
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school intends to establish partners with local colleges,
including "SUNY Geneseo, Nazareth College, St. John Fisher
College, Monroe Community College and Bryant and Stratton
College." 191 In terms of stakeholder buy-in, University Prep's
mission is "for its students to master higher order thinking
skills, productive life skills and to develop the quest for
learning needed to graduate from high school, succeed in
higher education, and to be successful in the work place." 192 "To
achieve
its
mission,"
University
Prep
anticipates
"implement[ing] a specific curriculum known as Experiential
Learning Outward Bound .... " 193 ("ELOB"). ELOB uses an
"active pedagogy" that "engage[s] students using ELOB
structures that encourage rigor, collaboration, leadership
skills, and character building. . . . [and] utilizes learning
expeditions that cross disciplines to engage students in real
world applications of required curriculum content." 194
Because the charter admits only males a presumption
exists against University Prep's constitutionality. 195 This
presumption can be rebutted, however, if the government
shows an "exceedingly persuasive, genuine" justification for the
segregation that does not rely on overbroad generalizations
about the different capacities of the sexes, "serves 'important
governmental objectives and . . . the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives,'" 196 or if the government offers a comparable
alternative to the excluded sex. 197 Enrollment must be
voluntary, and comparable options such as courses, services,
and facilities must be available to students of both sexes.
In approving University Prep's charter application, New
York stated that "the school's goal of promoting equal
educational opportunity for males that are not receiving the
benefits of public education in Rochester in proportion to
females ... serves an important governmental objective." 198

191. Id.
192. Id. at 1.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 531.
196. See Id. at 533 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id. at 531.
198. UPREP SUMMARY, at 5.

U.S.

142, 150
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New York's important government objectives included
promoting "public school diversity and choice" and serving the
area's needs of male students with documented difficulties in
the traditional public schools. 199 New York indicated that the
sex-segregated admissions policy was substantially related to
those objectives, and "not based on invidious discrimination
against females." 200
Since the Court's last guidance on sex-segregation in VMI,
NCLB's mandate for the DOE to revisit legally consistent sexsegregated education, 201 the 2006 DOE Regulations, and New
York's authorization of sex-segregated charters constitute
arguably meaningful federal and state justifications in favor of
sex-segregated charters. But meaningful does not equal
"exceedingly persuasive," and beyond providing these broad
justifications, the University Prep charter approval also
articulated specific policy reasons for allowing University Prep
to be sex-segregated. The application's approval was based on
"numerous studies and experts that support single sex
education, including Lee, Byrk, Marks, Mael, and Riordan.
These researchers confirm that single-sex schools improve
student achieuement." 202 However, many of the authors on
which New York relied to confirm its conclusion failed to
control for meaningful variables in their studies, are outdated,
have indicated that any benefits associated with sex-segregated
schooling are inconclusive, and have been improperly used by
proponents of sex-segregated education.
For example, Nancy Levit conducted an exhaustive policy
analysis that concluded, "the studies [including Lee, Byrk,
Marks, and Riordan] show no consistent advantages in
educational quality in single-sex schools, once confounding
variables are controlled." 203 Levit further stated that "Lee and
Byrk did not control for 'possible preexisting differences in
academic achievement, prior course work, self-concept, locus of
control or other school-related behaviors and attitudes that
were considered as outcomes.'" 204 Moreover, Lee and Marks

199. !d.
200. ld.

201. See Part III, supra.
202. UPJ{EP SUMMAHY, at 1 (emphasis added).
203. Levit, supra note 1 at 521.
204. !d. at 487 (citing Herbert W. Marsh, Effects of Attending Single-Sex and

Coeducational High Schools on Achievement, Attitudes, Behaviors, and Sex Differences,
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demonstrated that boys who attended sex-segregated high
schools experienced "no statistically significant effects, either
positive or negative, on college attitudes and values,'>20 5 and
graduates of all boys schools were "less likely to show concerns
for social justice" and were "less satisfied with the nonacademic
aspects of their colleges .... "206 While Fred Mael indicated in
1998 that sex-segregated schooling may provide "academic and
attitudinal benefits for at least some students," 207 his more
contemporary 2005 research prepared for the DOE concluded:
"For many outcomes, there is no evidence of either benefit or
harm." 208
Peeling back the layers, the three overarching reasons
behind charter success appear to cause student improvement in
sex-segregated schools, not the sex-segregation per se. For
example, Lee not only "credited the organizational and
administrative characteristics common in single-sex Catholic
schools for their 'success"' 209 but also believed that "separating
adolescents by gender for secondary schooling is not an
appropriate solution ... in educational outcomes, either in the
short or the long run." 210 Providence College Sociology
Professor Cornelius Riordan's 1999 research stated:
single gender schools work ... for girls and boys, women and
men, whites and nonwhites, but this effect is limited to
disadvantaged students. Research has demonstrated that the
effects of single-gender schools are greatest among students
who have been disadvantaged historically - disadvantaged
minorities, low and working class youth . . . . Furthermore,
these significant effects for at-risk students are small in

81 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 70, 72 (1989)).
205. Valerie E. Lee & Helen M. Marks, Sustained Effects of the Single-Sex
Secondary School Experience on Attitudes, Behaviors, and Values in College, 82 J.
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 578, 585 (1990).
206. Id. at 586.
207. Fred A. Mae!, Single-Sex and Coeducational Schooling: Relationships to
Socioemotional and Academic Development, 68 REV. EDUC. RES. 101, 101 (1998).
208. FRED MAEL ET AL. SINGLE-SEX VERSUS COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLING: A
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW, AT X (POL'Y & PROG. STUD. SVC. 2005). This study included "'an
exhaustive search" that began with a review of 2,221 studies. Id.
209. Levitt, supra note 1 at 505 n. 395. In addition, Lee stated that she '"found
positive effects from single-sex education 'only in Catholic schools.' The findings there
were consistent: positive effects for girls but no difference for boys." Id. at 487 (citing
Valerie E. Lee, Is Single-Sex Secondary Schooling a Solution to the Problem of Gender
Inequity, in AlviERICAN Ass'N UNIV. WOMEN EDUC:. FOUND., SEPAHATED BY SEX: A
CRITICAL LOOK AT SINGLE-SEX EDUC. FOH GIRLS, 41, 43 (1998)).
210. Lee, supra note 209, at 46.
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comparison with thr much larger effects of home background
and type of curriculum in a given school. 211

The pro-academic choice made by parents and students is the
key explanatory variable .... [I]f you could produce this result
without [sexJ exclusion, that would be preferable but it is not
possible in American society or schools at this time."

That time was ten years ago, only a few years into the
charter movement and too early to study how charters, rather
than sex-segregated schooling, affected Riordan's key variable
of choice. Assuming arguendo that Riordan's research was
correct that choice is the key variable to greater academic
success in sex-segregated environments for historically
disadvantaged urban youth, then the argument for sexsegregated charters is even weaker today. Again, in 1999,
Riordan noted:
This academic environment is a function of the choicemaking
process that is made by students who attend single-gender
schools. In this regard, it is entirely different from a set of
structures or programs that are put into place by educators. In
single-sex schools, the academic environment is normative in
a true sociological sense. It is a set of rules established by the
subjective reality . . . of participants, which takes on an
objective reality as a set of structural norms ....
[A]alternatives . . .
for
creating
a
pro-academic
environment . . . in schools generally should be considered.
Specifically, examine the organizational features of effective
schools. 212

By taking a system that permits for choicemaking and
coupling it with an examination (and presumably replication)
of successful organizational characteristics, and adding a
normative environment (i.e., stakeholder buy-in), charters ipso
facto negate any exceedingly persuasive justification for sexsegregated education.
More contemporary studies also support this conclusion. In
211. Comment. Cornelius Riordan, in Single-Sex Schooling: Law, Policy, and
Research, 2 BI\OOKINGS lNST. PAPERS ON EDUC. POL. 231, 283-84 (1999) (emphasis
added). Riordan's research included solely sex-segregated schools, not sex-segregated
classrooms. as he believed that "an academic culture that is endemic to single-sex
schools . . . cannot be produced in one or two classrooms within an otherwise
coeducational school." !d. at 28:3, 285.
212. !d. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
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2005, Lee Hubbard and Amanda Datnow examined California's
sex-segregated public school pilot program and stated that
"these schools' successes were due more to the interrelated
contributions of the schools' organizational characteristics,
positive student-teacher relationships, and ample resources." 213
Again, organizational architecture, choice, and buy-in - the
very components creating charter success - are what support
improved urban public education, not sex-segregation. 214
Moreover, a study published in late 2008 led by Professor
Riordan similarly confirmed that the results of sex-segregated
schooling were mixed. 215 Another study published in 2009
stated that sex-segregated education led to "limited benefits,"
and the results of the study did "not provide a ringing
endorsement of single-sex education." 216 Nonetheless, the sole
area in which that study found that sex-segregated schooling
"may. . . provide an important opportunity to continued
improvements in educational quality" was for black males and
low income students, who "experience unique gains" in sexsegregated classes. 217 While the evidence on sex-segregated
schooling IS inconclusive, even assummg arguendo that

213. Lea Hubbard & Amanda Datnow, Do Single-Sex Schools Improve the
Education of Low-Income and Minority Students? An Investigation of California:~
Public Single-Gender Academies, :~6 ANTHROP. & EDUC. Q. llfi, 115 (2005).
214. See also Deborah L. Rhode, Single-Sex Schools Can Only Be Way Stations,
1997 NAT'L L.J. A19 (stating that "[c]oeducational classrooms that use teaching
strategies common in all-female environments have proven equally successful m
improving girls' math and science."). Moreover, Beth Williger asserted that
studies indicate that certain components, other than the separation by sex, create
equitable and effective educational environments: (1) a relatively small student
body that allows students to develop a sense of personalism and connectedness to
the group; (2) a strong emphasis on academic content and achievement; (:l) high
expectations for student achievement; and (4) a shared understanding of and
commitment to the school's mission and values.
Beth Willinger, Single Gender Education and the Constitution, 40 LOY. L. REV. 253,
256 (1994).
215. RMC RES. CORP. (led by Cornelius Riordan), EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF
PUBLIC SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS: PEHCEPTJONS AND CHARAC'l'EHISTICS ix, x 2008 (prepared
for DOE Office of Planning, Evaluation, & Policy Development) (stating:
The results of the systematic review are mixed
Among the concurrent
academic accomplishment outcomes. 5:3 percent were null (favored neither singlesex nor coed schooling). 10 percent had mixed results across sex or grade levels. 35
percent favored single-sex schooling, and only 2 percent favored coed schooling.
Among the concurrent socio-emotional outcomes, 39 percent were null, 6 percent
were mixed, 45 percent favored single-sex schooling, and only 10 percent favored
coed schooling).
216. Sherrilyn M. Billger, On Reconstructing School Segregation: The Efficacy and
Equity of Single-Sex Schooling, 28 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 393, 402 (2009).
217. Id. (emphasis added).
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research continued to confirm that "[s]ingle-sex education
affords ... benefits to at least some students" 218 -in this case
black males and low income students-such a justification was
acknowledged by the VMI court and still did not survive
constitutional scrutiny. As a result, even if New York had
important governmental objectives in offering sex-segregated
charters, the evidence proffered by the state in the University
Prep charter application did not bear a substantial relationship
to those important objectives. Because this relationship was
based on dated and unsupported data that only provides
hypothesized benefits to some students, the justification for
University Prep's sex-segregation cannot nse to the
exceedingly persuasive level required by VMI.

B. Possible Safe Harbors
The VMI majority indicated that unique sex-segregated
education may be constitutionally permissible if comparable
educational opportunities are provided for the excluded sex. 219
To claim that a traditional public school is comparable to a
charter is to negate the history, rationale, and basis for
charters' existence. Telling a student that the traditional public
school provides a comparable education ignores all three
prongs of what makes charters unique: choice through
markets, unique organizational structure, and stakeholder
buy-in. If traditional public schools were indeed comparable,
charters would not exist. Nonetheless, New York specifically
found that comparable facilities and programs existed for
females in Rochester's traditional public schools. 220 The state
indicated that "comparable facilities and programs" existed for
females in the traditional Rochester public schools, because
"the academic program and curriculum" provided to University
Prep was "founded on the identical . . . New York State
Learning Standards taught in the Rochester district schools,"
and the ELOB curriculum to be implemented at University

218. VMI, 518 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added).
219. "Virginia, in sum, while maintaining VMI for men only, has failed to provide
any 'comparable single-gender women's institution."' Id. at 553 (citation omitted). In
framing comparability, the VMI majority looked to Judge Phillips' dissent in the third
circuit, which included "substantially comparable curricular and extra-curricular
programs, funding, physical plant, administration and support services ... faculty[,]
and library resources." Id. at 548 (referencing VMI, 44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995)).
220. UP REP SUMMARY, at 5.
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Prep was "not a significant departure" from the curriculum at
the traditional public schools. 221 New York made this assertion
despite having stated elsewhere in the University Prep
Summary that the ELOB curriculum was already used by a
charter in the city of Buffalo, New York, and
its gth and lOth grade students outperformed all but one of
Buffalo's non-selective high schools on the state assessments
in English language arts and mathematics in its first year,
including high school grades; 90% of its students passed the
Living Environment Regents exam, and 88% passed the Math
A exam. 222

According to a recent third-party study, the ELOB
curriculum showed "highly promising evidence of success" 223
when compared to other curricula used for at-risk students.
The Rochester City Schools use the ELOB curriculum but only
in a school that requires students to complete an application
and screening process,2 24 and charters do not reqmre
admissions applications. 225 Moreover, University Prep
indicated that it intended to establish partnerships with a
number of specific local colleges that would benefit University
Prep students. 226 According to the Rochester City School
District's website, no such collegiate partnerships exist for its
schools during the academic year, although one school has an
affiliation with the College Board, and the school offers
"electives in law and citizenship." 227 How does excluding
females from these opportunities provide them with a
comparable opportunity in Rochester? Given these material
benefits of University Prep relative to the traditional public
schools, it is hard to believe that University Prep does not
constitute "a significant departure from what is offered in the
Rochester City Schools" and that "comparable facilities and

221. ld.
222. Id. at 1.
223. GEOFFREY D. BORMAN ET AL. COMPREHENSIVE SCI!. REFORM AND STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT: A META-ANALYSIS. REPORT No. 59 AT 32 (JOHNS HOPKINS UN!V. CTH.
FOR RES. ON THE EDUC. OF STUDENTS PLACED AT RISK ("CRESPAR"') Nov. 2002).
224. See Rochester City Schools High School Descriptor, School #58, World of
Inquiry School, http://www.rcsdkl2.org/school58/highschooldescriptor.html (last visited
Aug. 3, 2009).
225. See discussion of charter requirements, Part II.B, supra.
226. UPREP SUMMARY, at 2.
227. See Rochester City Schools,
http://www.rcsdkl2.org/schools/secondary/NWPREP.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
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programs for females . . . exist in the Rochester City School
District." 228
Nonetheless, because a number of other charters exist in
Rochester, including the Urban Choice Charter229 and the
Rochester Academy Charter School,2 30 females arguably may
have comparable educational opportunities. More troubling,
however, is that part of the stakeholder buy-in with charters is
not solely about having theoretical choices; a choice among
other schools that do not fit that stakeholder's wants is hardly
a choice. A school's organizational structure, including its
specific curriculum and pedagogy, influence a stakeholder's
choice and buy-in. For example, if an area had three charters,
an Afrocentric male school, a coeducational school focused on
math and science, and an all-girls school focusing on the arts,
the curricula are so divergent that their comparability would
be highly questionable. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence
in VMI stated that "one [school] could be strong in computer
science, the other could be strong in liberal arts. It would be a
sufficient remedy, I think, if the two institutions offered the
same quality of education and were of the same overall
caliber." 231 Even so, as New York illustrated in the University
Prep application approval, and as a third-party study
demonstrated, the ELOB curriculum is not of the same overall
caliber as that used in Rochester's other public schools, and no
reason exists to think that the ELOB curriculum as
implemented in Rochester would be anything but similarly
superior to Rochester's other public schools. As a result,
Rochester's other public schools do not appear to meet even the
lower standard of comparability set forth by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, let alone the existing standard of comparability
articulated by Justice Ginsburg in the VMI majority. 232
Beyond a safe harbor for comparability, the VMI Court also
indicated that sex-segregated public education may be
constitutional in other instances. For example, the Court stated
that sex-based classifications were permissible if used "to

228. Id. at 5.
229. UPREI' SUMMARY, at 2.
2:30. Id.
2:31. VMI. 518 U.S. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
2:32. As notpd above, the comparability standard discussed by the VMI majority
was based on the Court's opinion in Sweatt v. Painter, which required "substantial
equality."
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compensate women 'for particular economic disabilities they
have
suffered'. . .
'to
promote
equal
employment
opportunity' ... [and] to advance full development of the talent
and capacities of our Nation's people." 233 Indeed, the Court
noted that "it is the mission of some single-sex schools 'to
dissipate, rather than perpetuate, traditional gender
classifications."' 234 None of these reasons, however, were cited
by New York in the University Prep application, and it is,
therefore, unlikely that University Prep would satisfy these
exemptions for permissible sex-segregated public education
that the Court set forth in VMI.

VI. CONCLUSION
Relative to the history of traditional public education in the
United States, the charter movement, as those it seeks to
educate, remains in its youth. Various studies have
demonstrated charter success relative to traditional public
schools. To avoid the failed system of the past and the divisions
in public education exacerbated by large-scale bureaucratic
government control, markets should exist in which
communities of stakeholders can create and innovate with
public education. Having stakeholders, including students, buy
into the idea that schools want the stakeholders involved is
important in erasing many of the tensions and failures that
have existed and continue to plague the U.S. public education
system. 235 Because students can learn critical skills through a
variety of curricula, particularly through curricula that is of
interest to them, expanded educational markets should
continue to experiment with charters that offer curricula
centered around issues of cultural consciousness, social justice,
math and science, technology, arts, and so many others in
incubation. Charters are primarily successful because of choice,
buy-in, and structure. However, the charter market as
currently constituted is illiquid. Whether due to de facto or de
jure caps, the charter market's small size hampers those
attempting to attend charters, and it prevents sufficient signals
of charters' relative value from being distributed into the

2:3:3. VMI, .518 U.S. at 583 (citations omitted).
I d. at 534 n. 7.
235. See Jeff Duncan-Andrade and GASTON ALONSO ET AL., supra note 89.
234.
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educational marketplace. Spurred by incentives in the No
Child Left Behind Act and the Department of Education's
revised Title IX regulations, the number of sex-segregated
public schools has grown exponentially in the past decade.
President Obama's administration is working across the
political spectrum to incentivize additional charter growth, and
Secretary Duncan has historically supported sex-segregated
schooling. As a result, the development of even more sexsegregated charters is likely, and a 2009 sex-segregated charter
approval by New York provides proof of that development as
well as a useful study.
The case law that applies to sex-segregated schools is
murky. The U.S. Supreme Court has decided only one case that
classified primary and secondary public school ("K-12")
students based on sex, and that ruling was made by an equally
divided Court, without a published opinion. The Supreme
Court's most recent decision regarding sex-segregated public
education-at the college level in 1996-left Justice Scalia
dissenting that sex-segregated schooling was "functionally
dead." Meanwhile, the Court's most recent pronouncements
that involved not only K-12 choice schools but also K-12 school
segregation were 5-4 decisions that contained an unusually
high six opinions each. Research on sex-segregated public
schooling is inconclusive. Many studies, including those
authored by individuals relied on by New York in the
University Prep approval, suggest that the choice, structure,
and buy-in of sex-segregated schools is what makes those
schools successful. And because these three factors constitute
the hallmarks of charter success, and because the research on
sex-segregated public schooling is inconclusive, nothing
exceedingly persuasive currently justifies the existence of sexsegregated charters. Even if some students may benefit from
sex-segregated charters, VMI recognized that sex-segregated
education provided "benefits to at least some students," 236 and
the Court still struck down VMI's sex-segregation as
unconstitutional.
The traditional Rochester schools cannot be considered
comparable to the University Prep charter, as they are not
schools of choice, they lack the same buy-in and organizational
structure-including
the
specialized
curriculum-that

236.

VMI, i118 U.S. at 534.
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University Prep is implementing that proved to be of a higher
caliber elsewhere in the state. University Prep did not (and
likely could not) claim to compensate male students "for
particular economic disabilities they have suffered,"' "'to
promote equal employment opportunity,"' or "'to advance full
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's
people."' 237 Nor did University Prep have as its mission to
"'dissipate, rather than perpetuate, traditional gender
classifications."'238 As a result, a legislative desire to maintain
sex-segregated charters coupled with an application process
that displays even-handedness by the state with no invidious
intent still does not meet the high threshold set forth by the
VMI majority. No matter how well intentioned, the government
simply cannot do whatever it wants in the name of education.
Giving the government complete reign over education was
precisely what caused the need for education reform. The
benefits of charters appear to be what drive successful nontraditional public schools, not the claimed benefits of sexsegregated schooling. Choice, organizational structure, and
stakeholder buy-in are the real drivers of successful nontraditional public education, not segregation based on students'
genitalia.
Given the material expansion in sex-segregated public
education, combined with the current existence of sexsegregated charters across the country, charter innovation
should be as broad and deep as possible but should not include
sex-segregation unless it addresses the specific narrowly
tailored permissible exceptions set forth in VMI. If sexsegregated charters wish to remain within the purview of both
Title IX and the constitutional guidance set forth by the Court
in the above cases, sex-segregated charters should not be
formed as single-school LEAs, and they should: (1) exist only in
states whose legislatures are clear in supporting sexsegregated charters, (2) ensure that a genuinely comparable
education (i.e., "substantially equal") is offered to the excluded
sex, (3) advance the full development of the talent and
capacities of students, and (4) be created to (a)(i) redress past
discrimination and (ii) dissipate traditional sex classifications,
(b) compensate for particular economic disabilities suffered by

237. Id. at 533 (citations omitted).
238. I d. at 534 n. 7.
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that sex, or (c) promote equal opportunity. Otherwise, sufficient
room for charter innovation can exist by expanding the size of
the school marketplace and allowing for meaningful choice
based on structural factors and student buy-in without
excluding students from public resources based on the
students' sex.
To have any meaningful chance of surviving Title IX and
equal protection clause challenges, sex-segregated charter
legislation, applications, and governing documents should
employ the specific language above that the Court has
indicated would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. Using
such precise diction in hopes of passing constitutional scrutiny,
however, would likely force the proponents of sex-segregated
charters to change the vision and practice of the schools that
they wish to create, as these reasons neither appear to be the
objectives of sex-segregated charter founders nor are
mentioned in the legislative acts authorizing sex-segregated
charters. Nonetheless, if the sex-segregated charter legislation,
applications, and approvals worked within this narrow
language in practice, sex-segregated charters may survive
constitutional scrutiny; without such wording and its de facto
implementation, sex-segregated charters appear to violate the
equal protection clause and Title IX. The optimal course of
action for stakeholders to take in this still unchartered
territory may be to apply Chief Justice Roberts' rationale in
race-based public school segregation239 to sex-segregated
charters; simply put, perhaps the best way to stop
discrimination on the basis of sex is to stop discriminating on
the basis of sex.

2~i9.

See Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).

